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ABSTRACT
“DEMOCRACY” IN A VIRTUAL WORLD:
EVE ONLINE’S COUNCIL OF STELLAR MANAGEMENT AND THE POWER OF
INFLUENCE
by
Jessica Ireland
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor Thomas M. Malaby

Interest in virtual worlds has grown within academia and popular culture. Virtual
worlds are persistent, technologically-mediated, social spaces. Academic literature
focuses on issues such as identity, sociality, economics, and governance. However
studies of governance focus on internal or external modes of control; less attention has
been paid to institutions of governance that operate within both the virtual and real
worlds.
In EVE Online, the Council of Stellar Management (CSM) represents a joint
venture between developers and users to shape the direction of EVE’s virtual society. As
a group of elected representatives, the CSM represents societal interests to the game’s
developer, Crowd Control Productions (CCP). The CSM structures the relationship
between CCP and the player base, and shapes how these institutions manage the
development process. At the same time, cultural and political conventions of EVE’s
players at times work against these structures as CCP and the CSM seek to attend to their
own interests.

ii

In this thesis, I examine the intersection of culture, power, and governance, and
illustrate the consequences these negotiations of power have for the inhabitants of EVE
Online. The historical circumstances that led to the CSM’s creation shape its reception
among the community. As a model of governance, the CSM was designed as a
deliberative democracy to generate community consensus. This feedback is channeled to
developers through elected representatives. However, these channels of information
hindered discussions necessary for true democracy. I examine how power is generated,
leveraged, and mediated by the two cultures in which the CSM is embedded: EVE and
Icelandic cultures. I also illustrate the authority and legitimacy of the CSM from the
standpoint of its constituents. The CSM is understood within the same cultural
frameworks as in-game power structures.
Primary research was carried out during a one-year period in 2012. During this
time, I joined SKULL SQUADRON, a large corporation with a neutral diplomatic
mission. Snowball sampling was used to find informants. Three main methods were
used to interview participants: face-to-face interviews, text-based interviews through
EVE’s communication channels, and voice interviews conducted over Skype, an internetbased communications program.
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Perception is reality, and if a substantial part of our community feels like
we are biased, whether it is true or not, it is true to them. EVE Online is
not a computer game. It is an emerging nation, and we have to address it
like a nation being accused of corruption… A government can’t just keep
saying, “We are not corrupt.” No one will believe them. Instead you have
to create transparency and robust institutions and oversight in order to
maintain the confidence of the population.
CEO Hilmar Veigar Pétursson
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Preface: Regarding Anonymity in Virtual Worlds
Conducting research in virtual communities presents unique challenges to the
researcher. In traditional ethnographic field sites, anonymity is guaranteed to the subject
either by the conferring of a pseudonym or by “burying individual identities in
description of abstract roles.”1 Within virtual worlds, anonymity can sometimes
guaranteed by the format; avatars are not necessarily linked to personal real world
information, and character names can easily be created for research purposes on any
number of game servers.2
In that regard, ensuring anonymity in the current investigation proves somewhat
of a challenge. Unlike many virtual worlds, EVE Online exists on one single shard
server. This means that all characters exist within the same persistent virtual space. And
as some of the players, institutions, and corporations I encountered are well-known, a
basic description or pseudonym would not confer the same degree of anonymity had I
chosen a different site for fieldwork.
To compound the problem, the Council of Stellar Management—the governing
body whose activities make up the bulk of my investigation—is the only institution of its
kind within EVE. Players are elected by popular vote to serve on the CSM, and thus are
known to many of EVE’s player base. As part of their duties, representatives meet with
EVE’s game developers at Crowd Control Productions’ corporate headquarters in
Reykjavik, Iceland.3 However since CCP could not guarantee the CSM’s personal
information would remain private during travel, representatives are required to release

1

(Gusterson 1996:xvii)
(Boellstorff et al. 2012)
3
Initially summits with CCP were held once per six month term. This was raised to two summits when the term limits
were extended from six months to one year.
2

2
their real life information to the community as part of the election process. This is
considered part of their role as elected representatives. Similarly, academic research
convention often makes exceptions for data gathered when politicians are carrying out the
duties of their public office.
The challenge, then, is to find a way to confer some degree of anonymity to small
number of subjects that are disproportionately well-known within a large virtual world,
where public and private information are already intertwined. To address this difficulty,
most of the subjects interviewed are referred to as “source,” or “informant,” or more
generally “a CSM.” This should not be seen as distinguishing between current or past
members of the council. I do not make any attempt to make any detailed descriptions of
their exploits or corporate history within EVE. There have been cases where real life
player information has been dragged through international media when EVE news
happens, and this vagueness is a deliberate attempt not to replicate those incidents.
Like other EVE players, some CSMs give interviews with gaming media,
maintain active blogs about their political activity, etc. In these cases, the name attached
to the source is used. This may be the in-game or real life name of the individual. I have
made no attempt to link real life and virtual identities, even if both are known to the EVE
community.
Traditional pseudonyms have been kept to a minimum, either of in-game
corporations or of players themselves. When anonymity cannot be guaranteed, the virtual
name has been preferred over the real life name. Where noted, real life names have been
used with permission. To those players who I promised the ability to create their own
pseudonyms—PAX, Buffy Summers, Furious George, and Scrotal Recall—I appreciate

3
your creativity, and I hope you will forgive the omission to address these methodological
concerns.

4

Chapter I: Introduction
Introduction
“I have a final, somewhat unrelated question,” I asked somewhat hesitantly.
“This actually comes by way of a friend…He wanted to know what the strength of the
EVE ISK was compared to the Icelandic króna?”
It was early summer, and my fieldwork in EVE Online had just begun. I had been
playing for six weeks, which was barely enough time to get my bearings. In lieu of a
learning curve, EVE is notorious for its “learning cliff” and I was feeling a bit out of my
depth.4 EVE Online is a massively multiplayer online game, or MMO, in which
thousands of players share the same persistent virtual world.5 These virtual worlds
become the forum for large groups of players to tackle large in-game challenges or
simply act as a social space. This particular virtual world is set in New Eden, a large
universe in deep space, inhabited by several races of immortal humans.
My first interview was a group interview with several game developers employed
by the company Crowd Control Productions, or CCP, which developers and publishes
EVE Online.6 CCP is located in Iceland, which is five hour time difference from where I
live in the United States. As far as interviews go, talking with game developers before I
had a chance to grow accustomed to the world felt similar to EVE’s harsh learning curve
itself; however with so much to learn in game, I will be considered a new player for at

4

(Space Junkie 2011)
I have attempted to define game-related terms within the main text itself. However, a glossary is included as a
reference for the sake of convenience.
6
The commonly used acronym CCP is evocative of CCCP or Союз Советских Социалистических Республик.
CCCP is translated into English as USSR, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such parallels are interesting given
the more authoritarian structures of governance that have developed in EVE, which allows one to wonder how much
“crowd control” that CCP can claim over its users.
5
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least the next year, if not longer. In fieldwork, as in EVE itself, you simply jump in and
hope for the best.
To prepare for the interview, I sat researching my prepared questions at my friend
Alexei’s apartment as we watched the European Championship football matches on
television.7 The intermittent conversation meandered through international affairs,
mirroring the international sporting event. Then I mentioned my upcoming interview
with Icelandic developers.
“You should ask them about the ISK,” Alexei said during a commercial break.
“What do you mean?” I asked. EVE’s virtual currency is called the ISK or
interstellar kredit.
“The Icelandic króna. I heard a news story last month that they’re thinking about
adopting the euro as their national currency,” he explained. Over the past few years
Iceland has witnessed the collapse of its economy, toppling their government in the
process. This has led some to speculate on whether Iceland with its 321,857 citizens is
large enough to support its own currency.8
“So… Their national currency is the Icelandic króna, or ISK, and EVE’s virtual
currency is the interstellar kredit, or ISK?” I asked, the football match in the background
momentarily forgotten.
“I wonder how one ISK compares to the other.”
For a brief split second after I asked the developers my question, there was
silence. Then the Skype channel filled with hearty laughter. Skype is an internet

7

In keeping with the international nature of this thesis, preference is shown for international spellings and conventions
when possible. In this case, I refer to European-style football or American soccer.
8
(Statistics Iceland 2013). See (Planet Money 2012) for the referenced discussion on Iceland’s possible adoption of
the Euro. At the time of this writing, Iceland still uses the króna as its national currency.
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application that allows users to communicate over voice, video, or text-based chat.
Skype allowed me to connect with many international informants, such as developers in
Iceland. “The basic answer to that is actually a rather scary one,” described one
developer. “Due to the currency controls that are in Iceland today, one cannot really talk
about the value of Icelandic krónur because it is set by the Seðlabanki.” Seðlabanki
Íslands is Iceland’s central bank, which stepped in to fix the value of the króna during
Iceland’s economic crisis. “It is a made-up value. It is not a real value.” We talked for a
few minutes about the fluctuations of the Icelandic króna compared to the stability of the
interstellar kredit. The virtual ISK can be given a value relative to the PLEX, or Pilot
License Extension, a virtual item that can be used to add 30 days of game time to a
player’s account. A PLEX can be purchased with real world money and traded on EVE’s
auction house; the ability to move between virtual currencies and real currencies allows
comparison to be made about the relative strength of the different ISKs.
“So you can at least state that the interstellar kredit, the ISK in Eve, is more stable
than the Icelandic króna, the other ISK,” the developer described.
“That is a scary answer,” I said. We laughed and the other developer agreed.
“If it continues like this, there will be a point in the future where the ISK in-game
will be more valuable than the Icelandic króna, but the problem there is that [Seðlabanki
Íslands is] putting these restrictions on exactly to avoid further devaluation of the
currency.”
I paused for a moment to consider the relationship between the two worlds.
While there is no separation between the virtual and real worlds, virtual worlds are not
often considered in terms of the real world cultures responsible for their creation. Being

7
so new to EVE myself, I was unsure where other parallels between Icelandic culture and
EVE’s culture might exist. “In the discovering that the in-game ISK is similarly named
to the Iceland’s currency, are there other crossovers between the Icelandic culture and
Eve’s culture that someone who is American and less familiar with your culture might
not pick up on?”
“You are asking if there are similarities between the worlds, where there is
darkness, danger, a lack of humbleness? Where there is—”
“An eye for an eye!” added the other developer.
“Yes, an eye for an eye method of judgment. Where there is a sense of
democracy, a thriving economy that yet is isolated by itself? I hardly see any correlation
at all.”
The developers laughed. “But on answering this question realistically, there is a
lot of commonality between the Eve universe as it is and the history of Iceland.”

Located about 45 km east of Reykjavík lies Þingvellir or “Parliament Plains.”
Part of the North Atlantic Rift system, Þingvellir is a combination of rugged canyons,
waterfalls, geysers, and pasture land. 9 Remnants of earlier structures are scattered
among the landscape, giving it an almost nostalgic feel for earlier, simpler times. For
Icelanders, Þingvellir is an important source of cultural and historical pride; it is the
birthplace of the Alþing, the world’s oldest parliament. The vestige of an earlier
Germanic tradition, alþings were used by the early Norse settlers to Iceland to resolve
local disputes.10 Free men with perhaps some “minimal social status” would gather to

9

(Thingvellier National Park n.d.a)
(Karlsson 2000; Tomasson 1980)
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8
debate public affairs.11 These matters were then referred to goðar, local chieftains that
undertook the administration of public affairs.12
While the goðar may have played a religious role as well, the authority that rested
in this office was based on a goðar’s “personal authority” and his ability to provide his
subjects a “just and effective” rule.13 As Iceland’s small founding population grew, so
did the need for a common set of laws to govern them. Without an agreed upon
framework, there were no incentives for goðar from neighboring districts to work
together to settle disputes. Sent to Norway to study their law and culture, a man named
Úlfljót proposed a national Alþing to help institute a framework of governance for
Iceland.14 It was this Alþing that brought together disparate factions within the country
to found the Commonwealth of Iceland in 930.15
Driven by a need for autonomy, personal freedom, and equality, Iceland’s
Commonwealth was characterized by the lack of a centralized executive power.16 And
while, as Karlsson argues, the founding of the Alþing was not founded “by or for a
nation”—there is not necessarily evidence to ascribe the title of nation to Iceland’s
population that early in its history—the founding of the Alþing is wrapped up in the
mythology that has come to describe the founding of that nation.17 More likely, the
Alþing brought together a community that, for the first time, began a conversation of
what was desired for the newly settled land on a national scale. It was a place set aside
for Icelanders to decide what it meant to be Icelanders, and created a strong sense of

11

(Karlsson 2000:21)
(Karlsson 2000:19; Magnússon 1984)
13
(Magnússon 1984:12)
14
(Magnússon 1984)
15
(Magnússon 1984; Hastrup 1998)
16
(Hastrup 1998; Karlsson 2000)
17
(Karlsson 2000:21)
12
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ethnic identity.18 The Alþing has come to be seen as an integral part of the mythology
about the birth of Iceland as a nation and what it means to be Icelandic, and that history is
embedded within the beauty of Þingvellir.19
While Icelanders are rightly proud of their connection with the earliest forms of
representative governance, the Alþing is not the only way Icelanders have explored new
forms of governance. In June 2008, nine representatives from EVE Online flew to
Reykjavik, Iceland for a different kind of Alþing: a face-to-face summit with game
developers at the company headquarters of Crowd Control Productions, or CCP.20
Dubbed the Council of Stellar Management, or CSM, elected representatives brought
player concerns directly to game creators in a unique experiment in the governance of
virtual worlds. There developers and players would come together to decide on the best
course of action for EVE’s online society for the next few months.
Emphasizing Iceland’s role in the birthplace of new forms of democracy, CCP
took the newly elected council to Þingvellir to underscore the importance of this
experiment. As CCP economist Eyjólfur Guðmundsson would charge the council:
You will start to function as the chieftains in Iceland in the old
days. You will convey the message to Alþing, which is basically
when you meet us down at CCP, and you will tell us what needs to be
done. You are taking the first step. You are the first Quarter of the
online environment. You are the first chieftains of the Internet.21
18

(Karlsson 2000; Anderson 2006). Anderson argues that the advent of print media and newspaper distribution helped
to facilitated discussion of what it meant to be French and a French nation during the French Revolution. This created
community and a sense of national identity between citizens that would never meet. Similarly, the Alþing brought
together all free men of Iceland. This facilitated a forum for a public discussion of what it meant to be Icelandic and
how Icelanders should behave. Perhaps the focus on individual agency in Iceland’s law—as opposed to finding a new
top-down method of government in France—is why, as Karlsson argues, the Alþing generated a strong ethnic identity
and not a sense of nationalism (2000:199).
19
(Hastrup 1998:32; Thingvellier National Park n.d.b)
20
(Schiesel 2008)
21
(van Nes & Wolting 2009). The judiciary branch of the Alþing was composed of Quarters. The country was divided
into four Quarters, roughly corresponding to the cardinal directions: West, North, East, and South. Members of these
courts were nominated by the goðar, which comprised the legislative branch. Spring assemblies were held in each
Quarter to decide local issues. Issues that were undecided were left to the Fifth Court, held at the national Alþing. See
(Karlsson 2000:20-27).
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Recorded on film by a documentary film crew, the difference between the new forms of
governance and the old are plain to see. Tech-savvy gamers in t-shirts and sunglasses
stand in stark contrast to the rugged Icelandic landscape. The mixture of excitement and
skepticism of the new “chieftains of the Internet” is plain to see, and is understandable
within its cultural context.22 EVE Online shares much in common culturally with that of
Iceland’s early history. Though decisions were made at the Alþing, there was no
centralized state to enforce decisions; while under the purview of regional chieftains, the
ultimate resolution of conflicts was up to the individual. Sanctioned vengeance was far
more common than arbitration or formal adjudication.23 Similarly, the CSM was forged
from a period of intense unrest within the EVE community, and held only the capacity to
advise CCP on widespread player concerns. While democratic in its elections, what the
CSM lacked was the agency to enforce the will of its constituents. Both societies have
been described as societies of “ultimate individual freedom, where even seats in
parliament were a marketable commodity.” 24 In both historical Iceland and in EVE
Online, though the ultimate enforcement of the law is up to the individual, the understood
democratic principles became a necessary framework that governed relationships
between those individuals.
For EVE Online, however, it is important to remember that while the CSM may
operate on democratic principles, the organization in which it is embedded is not a
democracy. As a business, CCP’s mission is to “attract and retain customers by

22

(van Nes & Wolting 2009)
(Durrenberger 1989)
24
(Karlsson 2000:27)
23
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providing top quality online entertainment.”25 CCP can choose to take or leave the
CSM’s suggestions and advice for business reasons—such as difficulty in
implementation, limitations of the code, etc.—without explanation to the citizens which
called for action on a given proposal. The ability for democratic action on behalf of the
CSM is entirely dependent on CCP’s desire to implement its proposals.
As the CSM White Paper notes, as the entire virtual society exists “within the
technical framework provided by CCP, it must have also evolved in part because of
CCP.”26 CCP governs the architectural and structural components that maintain the
complex sociotechnical framework necessary for EVE’s existence. However, CCP itself
is not a neutral institution. Its employees exist within both CCP’s function as a business
and more generally within the real world location that brings them together. In the real
world, CCP company headquarters are located in Reykjavik, Iceland.27 And while CCP
has offices in other areas, it was founded in Iceland, and the decision-making power has
historically been retained by Icelandic staff. While not deterministic, this allows certain
cultural and historical influences to shape CCP’s decisions and thus has consequences for
the virtual citizens within its care.
The embedded nature of the CSM also works to influence it from the other
direction as well. While the CSM is composed of EVE players, the creation of the CSM
was not driven by the players. The CSM was not designed by players as an emergent
reflection of EVE’s culture; it was handed to players as a tool to redress growing player
concerns. The EVE community generally views democracy with a healthy dose of

25

(Crowd Control Productions 2011a)
(Óskarsson 2008:6). The White Paper is the CSM’s founding document. However, it is not static in the sense that it
is “finished.” Updates and changes to this document have been made to reflect the most current information, and a new
version was released in late March, 2013. See (Óskarsson 2013).
27
CCP has offices located in other areas, such as Atlanta, Shanghai, Berkshire, and Newcastle.
26
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skepticism. Most corporations, large groups of players that band together for a common
goal, are run as dictatorships, and democracy is held to be an inefficient form of
governance in a world that demands decisions be made quickly. And while developers
acknowledge this tension by letting the CSM’s elections and processes run in as EVElike manner as possible—buying, selling, and scamming votes, for instance—many EVE
players first felt the CSM to be nothing but a publicity stunt that related little to actual life
in EVE.
This is not to suggest that the CSM has no function. On the contrary, I would
argue that it serves a very important function for those players who choose to take
advantage of it. But it is essential to keep in mind that the CSM’s deeply embedded
nature affects its ability to represent the wishes of the players of EVE. At different times,
these influences either prohibit or facilitate the CSM’s ability to develop practices of
governance and push for meaningful political change. This is not to propose that a
multiplicity of contexts, subjectivities, or realities fragment the democratic process.
Rather it is the purpose of this thesis to examine the ways in which different structural,
cultural, and historical influences shape and constrain political action within EVE
Online.28

28

Another possible factor that is not considered here is the international makeup of the CSM itself. Elected
representatives have come from many countries, some of which are non-Western and are historically anti-democratic.
However, I felt analyzing the specific makeup of the CSM’s elected representatives and comparing it to the processes
of the CSM over time would infringe on the confidentiality I promised my subjects. I could not determine each
individual’s attitudes toward their country’s political structure without extensive interviewing. Since the subject pool is
so small, a pseudonym could not offer anonymity if a member was the only one elected from a particular real world
country. As CSM members are required to give their legal names to the EVE community as part of the election
process, it is not possible to foresee all possible consequences of having players detail their attitudes toward their real
life governments.
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Governance in Virtual Worlds
Academic interest in the governance of virtual worlds has grown along with the
interest in virtual worlds more generally. However this literature mainly focuses on
modes of governance that are primarily internal or external in nature. Internal
governance structures would be those that arise organically within the game world, such
as guilds or clans, which serve to moderate in-world concerns. External concerns would
be reflected in literature that focuses on the embedded nature of virtual worlds:
architectural methods of governance like architectural code or the relationship between
developers and the worlds they create. This loosely borrows from Burke’s examination
of MMOs as sites of sovereignty.29 Within these virtual spaces, the “ground upon which
governance acts” can be located in one of three places: with developers, within playerformed organizations, or as an artifact created within the world itself.30 Both heuristics
focus on the source from which governance arises, either as a constraint imposed from
without or an emergent institution that is formed from within. Less attention has been
paid to institutions of governance that operate both within the virtual community and the
real world. This is, in part, due to the rarity of this strategy of governance within virtual
worlds. While there are other examples of such hybrid forms of governance, EVE Online
is the first to attempt it in a large, graphically-rendered world.31

29

(Burke 2004)
(Burke 2004:2)
31
While EVE Online is not the only game that has attempted this model, there are few examples to follow. Most
notable are LambdaMOO and A Tale in the Desert. MOO stands for “MUD object-oriented,” and MUD stands for
“multi-user dungeon” or “multi-user domain.” These are text-based environments which provide persistent virtual
worlds in which players can interact. In MUDs, the focus is entirely text-based, and players respond to challenges that
have been built into the system. In MOOs, players create persistent in-game objects as a way of setting their own
challenges and shaping the world to their liking. While A Tale in the Desert is graphically rendered, it serves a smaller
population and does not aspire to the same level of detail as EVE. In smaller or text-based games, changes can often be
made to a game’s architecture in response to player demands with a reasonable amount of development resources. In a
fully-rendered game such as EVE, changes can require months of lead time for multiple departments to accommodate
such changes. See (Dibbell 1993 & 1999; Mnookin 2001; Genender 2005).
30
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The relationship between the designers of virtual worlds and those that inhabit
them has attracted the most scholarly attention. While the concerns are mainly structural
in nature, questions about the nature of governance range from what it means to be a
virtual citizen, the obligations of designers toward those that inhabit their worlds, and the
separation between real and virtual life. And while some ask if “best practices” of good
virtual worlds would not already closely resemble the “best practices” of good
governance, the comparison between real world governments and developers of virtual
worlds is an important consideration.32
In his book Code: Version 2.0, Lessig examines the different constraints that
regulate individual behavior in online environments: the market, cultural norms, laws,
and technological architecture.33 While the interplay between these forces work together
to shape behavior into predictable and manageable patterns, the architectural constraint of
software code is of primary concern. As a means to shape behavior, code becomes a
source of concern due to its ability to embed particular values by what it permits or
discourages within the spaces it creates. Moreover, the ability for real world
governments to take advantage of these architectural means for control becomes for
Lessig a matter of deep concern.
These concerns become more pressing for citizens of virtual societies. The
architecture can be structured to promote certain behaviors within the virtual spaces it
creates. For example, Steinkuehler describes an example from Lineage in which there
was a:
…well-known tendency for player-killers (PKers) to hang out in
newcomer (newbie) territories to prey on low-level characters who are
32
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easily killed. The game rules and regulations afford this sort of behavior
(without necessarily condoning it) because there is really nothing to stop
high-level “red” folks (avatars with red names that signify a high number
of previous player kills) from hanging out in easy areas to repeatedly kill
weaker ones… So, there emerges a tension between a common game
practice (PKers hunting newbies), afforded by the game’s own design
rules, and the game company and community’s needs for survival, which
include bringing new players into the game.34
Once the practice appeared, it would have been easy to change the code to forbid such
activities by high level players. And while cultural practices arose to balance game
design, Nardi notes that a “world in which ganking is possible was precisely the world
intended by designers, and it was that world they encoded into the rules.”35 And while
ganking, or killing a player unfairly, is considered poor etiquette, the game world was
architected to allow players to make such moral choices.
While the structure of Lineage’s low-level areas was architected in a way to allow
players to determine their ultimate use, it is easy enough to imagine a similar situation in
which that choice is taken from the players. It is this capacity for control and regulation
of behavior that lead some argue to that the power of developers is elevated above the
level of real world governments. Bartle argues that the ability of designers to control the
game world even down to the physics of the virtual environment raises their power to
godhood status.36 In addition to the ability to change the physical landscape, Bartle
describes the sometimes “draconian” use of developer control that, had they been applied
to real world governments, would be widely criticized for civil rights abuses: punishment
or exile without due process, property destruction, privacy infringement. Further control
can be gained by the mere implication of developer powers; as developers can see action

34

(Steinkeuhler 2006:201)
(Nardi 2010:71)
36
(Bartle 2006:4)
35

16
within their creation at any time, the possibility of observation compels socially
acceptable socially acceptable behavior. This is consistent with Foucault’s ideas about
institutions, where power relations are implicitly enforced through in-game structures.37
For Bartle, real qualitative differences exist between game designers as gods or
governments in that developers cannot be removed by their virtual citizens and
developers cannot fully relinquish their powers.38 By virtue of maintaining their creation,
the virtual world requires development companies to support their continued existence, at
least if they want to continue to turn a profit. Corrupt governments can be overthrown
through revolution, seized through military coup, or simply voted out of office; the same
opportunity does not exist for game designers.
However, even pulling the plug on a virtual world does not necessarily mean it
does not have continued existence. Virtual worlds are supported by third-party
applications, websites, blogs, etc. In the absence of the world itself, the social structures
generated can persist, shift to new online environments, etc.39 EVE Online supports an
elaborate metagame, in which out-of-game resources or information to affect in-game
play. This involves the use of corporate espionage, sabotage, hacking of rival
corporations’ web sites, or deployment of effective propaganda on the official forums. It
is not unheard of for EVE Online players to play only the metagame, eschewing the
virtual world entirely; as one informant would tell me, “The goal is to play the game
enough to where you don’t have to login anymore.” This generally supports Malaby’s
conclusion that if the ultimate expression of developer control can be attenuated in this
way, then “it is possible that this position of limited control is coming to be an undeniable
37
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feature of MMOGs, who are under pressure to relinquish some controls (or sovereignty)
over their creations.”40
Traditionally, the sovereignty that was afforded to players through the code was
through in-game governance structures that allowed players to govern their own affairs.41
These social structures have become standard features of the MMO genre, and have
“acquired standard capabilities and structures.”42 Malone argues that guilds represent
powerful forms of social organization within virtual worlds.43 Through the power that is
granted through the game architecture, players are afforded the ability to govern their
own affairs through hierarchical structures, formal rules of behavior; these structures are
legitimated and supported through social bonds that cultivate group identity and guildspecific economies.44 Additional forms of sovereignty can be ceded to guilds in the form
of allowing guilds or clans to create or control their own spaces. For instance, some
MMOs allow guilds to create or own their own guild halls, structures that may be used
for guild meetings, events, etc. These may be entirely guild-owned or perhaps may be
instanced; this allows every guild a copy of the same space, but does not fill the useable
space within the environment.
EVE Online goes one step further to allow corporations to compete and control
territory within the virtual world. Corporations are large groups of players that band
together for a common goal, similar to guilds. Corporations may decide to work
cooperatively and form an alliance, a collective organization of several member
corporations. Once a corporation has control or sovereignty over a section of the galaxy,
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they may set up infrastructure within the system—such as outposts, star bases, research
laboratories, construction arrays, etc.—and receive a variety of in-game benefits for their
corporation. These confer such benefits as a measure of protection for corporate
structures, a reduction in fuel costs for star bases, etc. Sovereignty can and frequently is
contested by rival corporations, as different systems contain different resources within
them.45
Such spaces are, for all intents and purposes, under control of the corporation that
claims sovereignty. Players are given the tools to assert their control of a given system
within the code of the virtual world, and sovereignty mechanics allow the “official
control of a system, as recognized by the EVE client.”46 Sovereignty mechanics are just
the structural way in which a corporation supports the cultural, political, and economic
ways to define a space as “theirs.”47 Neither could CCP envision the variety of values
and governance systems that arose to protect these spaces, from the libertarian to the
communistic to self-proclaimed freedom fighters dedicated to “freedom from statist and
imperialist tyranny.”48
And while some of these ideologies are explicitly part of in-game roleplaying, it
serves to highlight ways in which players make virtual spaces their own.49 As developers
afford more control and ownership over game areas to players, what goes on in those
spaces—the cultural ideologies used to justify the seizure and possession of sovereign
space, the lengths players will go to retain that control, etc.—become increasingly less
45
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predictable. For example, one EVE event that has passed into legend involves an alliance
going to extraordinary measures to destroy one of the first Titan ships in the game. One
of EVE’s largest ships, Titans wield extraordinary power. According to legend, the
destruction of the first Titan was brought about through a coordinated real world and ingame attack in which the power to the Titan owner’s house was cut. While there are
conflicting accounts of what actually happened to cause the destruction of the ship, the
tale of using real life measures to effect in-game change continues. In some ways, the
actual truth value of the story is irrelevant. What is important for EVE is that the story is
told, and whoever frames the narrative of that story—in which on alliance seems to have
access to very powerful methods and one suffers very tangible losses—accrues the social
and cultural capital as a result. 50 That sort of power is itself a very important weapon in
EVE.
As Taylor suggests, once developers “put a product out there the players will do
with it what they will, often playing in ways designers never anticipated.”51 Discussing
their experience with the avatar-mediated world Habitat, Farmer and Morningstar
describe:
It was clear that we were not in control. The more people we involved
with something, the less in control we were. We could influence things,
we could set up interesting situations, we could provide opportunities for
things to happen, but we could not predict or dictate the outcome.52
While contingent events that may occur once a virtual world is populated may put off
some developers, the uncertain outcomes are part of what makes the EVE environment
unique. EVE Online is a sandbox universe, in which the bare minimum of in-game tools
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is given to players, which are then in turn expected to create their own adventures. There
are no behavioral or cultural restrictions imposed by the developers, and players are
frequently encouraged to see what new heights they can drive EVE’s emergent story.
For example, one EVE event that occurred during the duration of my fieldwork
involved a massive attack on EVE’s busiest trade hub, Jita. Jita is located in high
security space, which means it is neutral territory guarded by the non-player character, or
NPC, police force known as CONCORD; this makes it a relatively safe and prosperous
place to do business. 53 Several months of planning culminated in a weekend-long
blockade, and effective military strategies were used to get around the NPC police. Ships
moving in or out of the area were quickly destroyed, and their weapons and materials
salvaged. Economic and material losses were substantial, and war profiteering was
rampant while ships, weapons, minerals, etc. were replaced. As developers, CCP could
have stepped in to prohibit what other games would have labeled a planned weekend of
tyranny. However, as CCP senior producer Jon Lander said in an interview, “I tell you
what, it’s going to be fucking brilliant.”54 Not only were the developers ecstatic about
the player-driven event, they made improvements to EVE’s server to accommodate the
increased load, and analyze the technical effects for the community afterward.55
This simplified accounting of a complex political, cultural, and economic event
highlights the potential for emergent action that has become a source of pride for EVE’s
developers and community. It is what sustains a population of 500,000 subscriptions on
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EVE’s single server, and developers do their best to architect the game to allow these
indeterminate outcomes.56 In this, we can see two different general modes of governance
at work within EVE. We can see that the architectural code and the social norms that
arise within that code work together to shape activity within the world; the code is
architected to promote player-driven behavior and that attracts players that enjoy a more
direct hand in shaping the adventures within the game universe.
As Malaby argues, we must be ready to examine how this “generates important
effects, both through the artifactual nature of their code and through the emergence of
shared conventions within and across their communities.”57 This roughly corresponds to
Steinkuehler’s “mangle of play” and Taylor’s suggestion that players work within the
game framework to actively construct cultures.58 While the architecture serves as the
primary method of regulation of behavior, it serves to engender the open-ended freedom
that EVE players enjoy and that becomes part of the cultural logic that drives game play.
This turn toward game design to engender participation within an indeterminate
system is an important one; through the application of “effort and cultural capital,”
players are encouraged to work within a given system for uncertain ends.59 Malaby
argues that this contrived indeterminacy is a shift from the bureaucracies of high
modernity to ones that architect and cultivate spaces for uncertain outcomes; the
important difference is the institutional need to “engage human imaginings of
possibility.”60
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In the management of virtual worlds, however, there is the countervailing need to
know as much about your player base as possible. Players are consumers, and thus it
makes good business sense to know and meet the needs of your consumers. In discussing
the shift from sovereignty to governmentality that accompanied the rise of the modern
nation state, Boellstorff suggests that the fundamental difference is the movement from a
more implicit form of governance—mainly through laws—to a more complex approach
based on an “infinitely knowable and improvable population.”61
Both Boellstorff and Malaby studied Second Life, in which Linden Lab was
broadly assumed to have complete control over its creation.62 As a way to encourage
player creativity, Linden Lab architected a space in which the power of content creation
was given to players. As a means of good business, it meets the need of Second Life
consumers to create and build their world. As a means of population management, it
highlights what is perhaps the only constant in an open-ended world: players will
continually do what you least expect of them. As Malaby describes, virtual worlds
“balance the presence of both regularity and indeterminacy.”63
In EVE Online, CCP takes this one step further. Not only is the space architected
to permit contingent events, but that code itself is somewhat open to negotiation. This is
one way of meeting Taylor’s challenge to afford players some responsibility and power
in the governance and maintenance of their world.64 Players approach CSM members
with their concerns and suggestions for the game, and CSM representatives in turn
present this feedback to CCP developers. While the CSM has no official capacity to
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enforce these changes, they lobby CCP developers to influence the game architecture to
best serve the cultural expectations of EVE players. Describes Hans Jagerblitzen, a
representative of CSM7, the CSM has “an audience with CCP, and we provide an
audience for player concerns. Influence is our greatest asset, and it is earned, not
granted.65 And while both the cultural and architectural constraints are at play for both
users and designers, they have a fundamentally different position of agency in the change
they can achieve through the mutual negotiation of the code.66 The cultural conventions
about government, governance, and expectations about what is possible within the EVE
framework therefore become the starting point for the negotiations between the CSM and
CCP. It is important to remember that EVE’s population has a broad international base;
the United States captures 36.25% of subscriptions, followed by the United Kingdom
(10.28%), Russia (10.27%), Germany (9.50%), Canada (5.15%), Australia (3.71%),
among a large number of others.67 Players, CSM representatives, and designers may
have wildly different perspectives on the need for and methods of representation within
real life, as well as within game. The main commonality therefore becomes EVE’s
virtual culture and the values it engenders. These shape the expectations of governance,
which in turn influence the way the code is negotiated between the CSM and CCP. And
while other forms of Lessig’s behavioral constraints—legal and economic—should not be
undervalued, the interplay between the cultural and the architectural become the primary
way of understanding how the CSM’s governance exists within EVE.
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The creation of the CSM serves to structure the relationship between CCP and the
CSM, and creates the method by which the institutions can each manage their own needs
through the game development process. 68 At the same time, the cultural and political
conventions of EVE’s players at times act counter to these routinizing actions as CCP and
the CSM seek to attend to their own interests.69 These countervailing tendencies serve as
imperfect forms of control as the relationship between CCP and the CSM evolves and
negotiates power behind closed doors. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the
intersection of culture, power, and governance, and illustrate the consequences these
negotiations of power have for the inhabitants of EVE Online.
First, I will examine the historical circumstances that led to the CSM’s creation.
Accusations of developer favoritism among in-game factions caused significant player
outrage. As a way to quell the discontent in his community, CEO Hilmar Pétursson
ordered an earlier, then discarded concept—the Council of Stellar Management—be
reinstituted as a method of community oversight and to, in Pétursson’s words, to “call
bullshit” on CCP when necessary.70 The distrust of CCP’s ability to provide a truly open
universe had important consequences for the shape and function that the CSM would
take. Specifically, the CSM would serve as both an avenue for players to address
concerns about the game world and as a way to effectively route these suggestions to
CCP to build a better product. As a model of governance, the CSM was designed around
the principles of deliberative democracy to give the community a way to reach consensus
on important matters. As a method of community feedback, this feedback would be
channeled to developers through elected representatives. However, these channels of
68
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information at times became more of a hindrance than facilitating discussions necessary
to true democracy. While the CSM’s structures have changed to accommodate different
forms of player feedback, this moves the CSM away from the principles of deliberative
democracy upon which it was founded.
Second, I will look at the way power is generated and leveraged by the CSM. The
ability of the CSM to influence CCP developers is central to the amount of power any
given CSM holds. This power is, in part, mediated by the two cultures in which the CSM
is embedded: EVE culture and Icelandic culture. As EVE players first, players operate
within a framework that operates under different cultural norms; as smart battle strategy,
players bring all available tools to any given engagement. Similarly, CSM6—held by
many players to be the most effective incarnation of the CSM—used all available
methods to leverage power within their given relationships with CCP. These take into
account considerations of the real world, rather than simply EVE’s own universe. For
CSM6, this involved using the media to gain control over the direction of the game. This
was made possible, in part, by CCP’s real world concerns. CCP was one of the few
companies to survive Iceland's economic collapse. Thus CCP’s successes led to a selfadmitted sense of hubris that some see as characteristic of the particular cultural and
historical circumstances.71 The attitude that “we must Work Hard [sic] to conquer the
impossible” allowed CSM6 to leverage their demands with their media contacts against a
threat of negative publicity.72 This translated into concrete financial losses in the
economically stressed country, and an expansion that addressed CSM concerns. This is
not the only strategy CSMs have used to exert influence over CCP, and the methods were
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not universally condoned by players; however the power of the CSM seems to be best
recruited when players behave within EVE’s cultural conventions. As such, the CSM has
evolved into an institution that is more in line with EVE’s expectations of effective
organization.
Finally, I will look at the authority and legitimacy of the CSM from the standpoint
of its constituents. As an imposed institution, the EVE community had not asked for selfgovernance. As an elected body without formally recognized power, its ability to enact
meaningful change at the level of game design was met with skepticism by many players.
This skepticism is bound within cultural ideas that are in part developed within a virtual
society that is always at war. As an organization, the CSM is held to the same standards
as in-game power structures and understood within those same cultural frameworks.
Democracy is seen as a weakness in times for war, and peacekeeping processes are seen
as vulnerabilities within those ideas. Thus CSM7’s push to codify and operationalize
“stakeholder” status—an undefined power granted by CCP to officially include the CSM
in the decision-making process—is greeted with skepticism by those in the community.
This hearkens back to the original incident that caused its founding as well as skepticism
of less combative forms of governance. It is no coincidence that the CSM has moved
from describing itself as a space parliament to more of a lobbying group that seeks to
exert influence over developers. This brings the CSM more in line with EVE’s own ideas
about how leadership in organizations is most effective.
These conclusions should be considered only within the particular circumstances
of the EVE community; the cultural mechanisms at work in EVE do not apply to all
virtual communities. More broadly, however, the current study does suggest that the
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emergent nature of the institution is important; cultural expectations regarding the ability
of an institution to govern affect how an institution is legitimized and afforded power
within the greater community. These ideas may become more relevant as virtual
communities become more prevalent within everyday life, particularly as they come to
serve as a resource for political action online and off.73

Methods
Primary research for this thesis was carried out between April 2012 and April
2013. During this time, I joined SKULL SQUADRON, a corporation with roughly 1,700
active players and an alumni network of 14,000.74 SKULL SQUARDON is a wellregarded corporation with a relatively neutral diplomatic mission within EVE. While it
considers itself a more-or-less neutral entity, this can be something of an implicit
challenge to other corporations; we were at war with at least one alliance constantly
during primary fieldwork.75 These wars as well as the charter of my corporation served
to determine the areas of the universe that were safe for me to travel.76 It also limited the
players I could speak with or what and where I could post on the official forums; SKULL
SQUARDON, like many other EVE corporations, is not a democracy.77

73

(Kellner 2003). Kellner argues that cyberspace can be used in new ways to promote radical change and revolution.
However, much of the potential he describes is utilizing the Internet as a common forum for discussion. This allows
for political change offline. However, these are communities that seem to develop around common offline interests,
rather than a community with a sense of identity rooted primarily online that comes together to promote online or
offline change. The CSM is more akin to the latter—an online community seeking change in that online world,
mediated in part through real life action.
74
SKULL SQAUDRON is a pseudonym.
75
In EVE, war is both an organized conflict and a game mechanic. Declarations of war or “war decs” can be purchased
by CEOs. War deccing another corporation or alliance flags enemy players in the game as hostile; you may then attack
them without security status penalty or retaliation from CONCORD, the NPC police force.
76
In addition to being unsafe to travel through enemy territory, wandering into the wrong sections of space might
precipitate a diplomatic incident which could lead to other wars. Some EVE corporations will shoot on sight if you
unwittingly fly through their territory or gate.
77
I could not, for example, post as an official representative of SKULL SQUADRON on the forums and speak on their
behalf. I was also discouraged from speaking to unknown pilots in local chat channels.

28
My status as a researcher served as a way around some of these constraints. I was
able to talk freely with players who might otherwise treat a verbal or mailed exchange as
an act of hostility. In reference to my informed consent document, one player was
amused at all the “qualifiers about how that you are not going to be horrible” because the
community prides itself on such sparring as part of the game.78 By providing an
informed consent document with university information, the document vouched for me
outside of EVE’s power relations and I was given access to information that might
otherwise have been politically charged. Some players remarked that it was a nice
change of pace to talk without worrying about political consequences.
I used two main methods to interview participants: voice or video interviews
conducted over Skype, text-based chat through Skype or EVE’s in game channels. A
small number of interviews were conducted face-to-face. Follow up questions were sent
to a few players through EVE mail or over email. Skype calls were recorded through
IMCapture, an application which records such calls, which were then later transcribed
through voice recognition software. Text-based interviews were saved through the EVE
client. A handheld digital recorder was used for face-to-face interviews. In addition,
field notes were typed on a secondary laptop during gameplay. All activities were done
in real time.
As this study primarily focuses on the Council of Stellar Management, this served
as my sample population. Interviews were solicited through in-game mail, just as if I was
any other EVE player. Responses were followed up to the best of my ability. Normal
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EVE players were solicited for interviews through snowball sampling. I also interviewed
a small number of CCP developers, and I received official permission to do so.
It should be noted that CSMs and developers both sign standard non-disclosure
agreements. This limited the information I could discuss with past and present CSMs.
For instance, I was not given insider information about upcoming game content, features,
or other such sensitive data. I also did not have access to official CSM communication
tools, such as the Skype channel that facilitates their real time communication with the
CCP development team. While real-world politics is rarely transparent, many CSMs
published extensive minutes of meetings and development summits; the recent trend is
moving toward full transcriptions with attributed quotes. Forum petitions submitted
through the Jita Park Speakers Corner are also up for public scrutiny. Some CSMs also
keep detailed blogs of their activities. While this lack of access somewhat limits my
findings, the wealth of publically available knowledge serves to offset some of the
information to which I did not have access.
My own personal experience with virtual worlds is relevant to my ability to
conduct research within these environments. Before logging into EVE Online for the
first time, I had extensive experience in MMOs. I played Final Fantasy XI for roughly
one year. I have played World of Warcraft since its release in 2004, at times with
intensive raiding guilds. I have had other passing experience with Guild Wars, Star
Wars: The Old Republic, Rift, Second Life, and Champions Online; each of these was
played for at least a month. These experiences gave me a wealth of knowledge of
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internet culture, memes, and internet slang, as well as a general understanding of
accepted game mechanics.79
I quickly learned, however, that my perhaps decade long experience with MMOs
had given me few transferrable skills to apply to EVE Online. EVE has a reputation for
being hard to learn, and I found that EVE lived up to that reputation. Space ship
navigation and fitting involves a great degree of math, and I spent a long time learning
the game mechanics. While there are a few tutorials built into the game through AURA,
the onboard ship computer, the information I found most helpful was through
community-resources.
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Chapter II: Governance
Introduction
Moving between stations in Gallente space, I listened to idle chatter in the
corporation recruitment channel.80 My Vexor—a cruiser spaceship outfitted for PvE
combat—navigated between planetary systems as I moved toward my next mission
objective.81 The game itself is beautiful: iridescent planets, glowing nebulas, and lush
gas clouds, set on a background of distant stars. In many systems, what are missing are
players. To the casual observer, one might assume that New Eden’s space is largely
empty.82 A player can move between multiple systems without seeing another pilot, and
then contact is discouraged. Unknown players regard each other with caution or outright
hostility, speed and stealth are valuable assets, and the unwritten rule forbids talking in
local chat.83 As one player would later tell me, “It’s not designed to look like cold, dark
space. It’s designed to be cold, dark space.”
Without the luxury of true virtual cities, much of EVE’s casual socializing is
hidden, segregated into a variety of concealed spaces.84 Players speak to each other over
third-party software such as Mumble or TeamSpeak, and type over many chat channels
built into EVE’s software. These are often password protected to keep out rival
corporation spies.85 Corporate recruitment channels are something of an exception; while

80

The Gallente are one of EVE’s four available player races.
In PvE or player versus environment gameplay, players battle virtual opponents that are generated by the game. A
mission is a task given to a player by an NPC to earn a reward. This may include reputation, money, or in-game items.
82
New Eden is the name given to EVE Online’s universe. Within the game lore, it is also the name of the first star
system settled by humans after traveling to the area.
83
The local chat channel is viewable to anyone who may be passing through. Unguarded talk may inadvertently pass
along sensitive information, such as ship position, fleet movement, etc.
84
Players can congregate in stations, structures that orbit moons in different systems. However, this only gives them
access to common chat channels. Avatar-to-avatar interaction does not exist within EVE at this time.
85
Corporate espionage is commonplace within EVE. Player corporations may freely engage in such activities as
planting spies within the ranks of its rivals as a means of gathering information. This information can be used for
military strategy, personal gain, corporate takeover, etc. These types of activities are often referred to as part of the
81

32
it is a good assumption that these are compromised by enemy players, these are safe
places where new players can ask questions of the old with relatively few political
consequences. It also provides an ideal place for grizzled veterans to regale new pilots
with tales of EVE’s past wars and scandals.
“I'm sorry... I keep forgetting...Who's BoB?” asked Tanner Firestorm, a newer
pilot like myself.
“Band of Brothers. Huge guild that had a stranglehold on the EVE economy, and
a very between the sheets relationship with CCP,” answered Desmond Ninebones. EVE
Online is marketed as an open-ended universe. Players themselves design in-game
content, and the capacity for the individual impact on the virtual world is part of what
makes EVE unique among MMOs. The incident between Band of Brothers, one of
EVE’s most powerful alliances, and CCP called into question a player’s ability to affect
change within that allegedly open-ended universe. If the game was fixed in some way,
what value could be said of the narratives players worked so hard to create? I settled in to
hear the older pilots retell the story, as one might relax into the comfort of a familiar
favorite. It has become part of EVE’s rich mythology, and storytelling also breaks up the
sometimes monotonous quality of mission running.
“There was a bit of shadiness with T20 giving someone in BoB a Sabre BPO and
a couple other things,” explained Booster Raydon, one of a number veteran EVE players
in the corporate recruitment channel. Blue print originals (BPO) are used in the
manufacturing of in-game goods, such as ships or ammunition, and can be worth a
fortune in interstellar kredits or ISK, the in-game currency. The idea that T20, a player
metagame. The metagame can be broadly defined as the use of out-of-game resources, activity, or information to affect
in-game play. Corporate espionage is not built into the mechanics of EVE Online as it was originally written, but
emerged as a style of play to support the in-game war for territory and power. See (Wes 2008 and PIR 2012).
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discovered to be a CCP developer, would hand such a profitable commodity to an
alliance undermines the value EVE players place on their efforts. “Really the issue wasn't
so much the BPO, it was more with how CCP handled it. The infraction itself wasn't a
huge deal in the larger scheme of things. There were larger concerns about [developer]
impartiality, and the whole T20 thing mostly was a symbol for it all.”
“It was the thin end of the wedge,” agreed Silas Burnray.
“So this was actually proven?” asked Firestorm.
“It's ultimately why the CSM exists today,” said Raydon. “CCP formed the CSM
as a reaction to all the T20 stuff for player oversight of CCP… [You] can argue whether
or not it accomplishes that goal, but that's why it was initially formed.”
As conversation turned to other tales of old, I looked out over the galaxy. The
impartiality of a virtual world is something that I often take for granted: the capabilities
and defenses of my ship, the tools I needed to eke out a living within virtual space, or
even the virtual space itself. When both the environment and your ability to act within it
are governed by unseen lines of code, developer impartiality becomes a very salient
concern. Player action is embedded within the game, and that behavior is primarily
regulated through the game’s code.86 Though the sociotechnical framework that supports
a virtual world is not neutral, the opportunity for developers to undermine player actions
exists in every aspect of the game.87 Suddenly, New Eden seems like very cold, dark
space indeed.
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History
This short exchange I witnessed during my fieldwork highlights the continued
importance of the Council of Stellar Management’s founding for EVE players. While
some of the details have perhaps been embellished over time, the story continues to be
told for good reason. It has become a cautionary tale of developer corruption, and the
seed for continued skepticism of CCP’s motivations in a culture that thrives on such
distrust. The circumstances in which the CSM was developed are crucial to
understanding the way in which it was structured and how it is perceived by the
community.
Rumors of that “between the sheets” relationship between Band of Brothers and
CCP had been emerging at the edge of public discourse for some time. Among the
charges was that Band of Brothers was run by EVE’s senior developers and members of
their volunteer staff.88 During a routine bit of forum espionage, one player realized that
there was substantial truth to the rumors.89 After rifling through archived private forums
of Reikoku—a corporation within the larger Band of Brothers alliance—a spy named
Kugutsumen felt it was his duty to share the extent of that relationship with the EVE
community. In a series of public exposés entitled “Reikoku Makes Its Own Luck,”
Kugutsumen presented evidence that Band of Brothers was aware of developers in its
ranks, a blatant violation of CCP policy.90
Although community manager CCP Kieron attempted to assure the community
that CCP was investigating the allegations and hopefully that would “put this issue
behind us once and for all and allow us to continue moving forward,” it was already too
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late.91 Immediate condemnation of CCP’s actions spread throughout the forums. As one
player described:
…[W]hy has it taken this many days (and angry posts) of “investigation”
including at least one “I hope we can now put this behind us” before the
truth came out? If this is indeed the whole truth and not someone drawing
the short straw and throwing themselves off the sledge to try to placate the
wolves? And yes, that is cynical. But when we've been this betrayed, both
in the original sin, in its policing, and in the time and pressure this “truth”
has taken to be dragged out, kicking and screaming, why should we have
any trust left? We who love this game have been betrayed.92
The community outcry brought with it further allegations of wrongdoing. Among
them included a charge that T20 had given blue print originals (BPOs) to Reikoku before
being forced to delete his account.93 More damaging was the charge that the incident had
been known to CCP since June 2006, and yet the leaked BPOs remained in the game for
eight months rather than admit misconduct on behalf of its staff.94 According to some,
the revenue generated from the illicit BPOs was used in part to fund a large scale war that
brought the destruction of the alliance Ascendant Frontier.95 As one player put it, “T20
had a direct and intentionally malicious hand in the dismantling of one of the largest
corporations in the game.”96
The confidence in EVE’s ability to provide emergent gameplay had been shaken.
In EVE, the ability to have a direct hand in the grander narratives of the game is part of
the attraction. The rewards of a flawlessly executed scam, military engagement, mining
operation, or trading partnership are tangible. In a single shard server, the prestige and
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power attained by such actions are known to every EVE player. Reaching these rewards
takes a tremendous amount of effort and patience. Skills, the talents that allow your
character to become more powerful and handle more complex tasks, are trained one at a
time in real time; becoming proficient at a certain skill can take months. Veteran players
plan their characters more than a year in advance. A similarly determined mindset is
cultivated in becoming a leader in the larger narratives that make EVE compelling.
Nothing in EVE is free; if you want to make a mark in the universe, you have to be
willing to put in the time and effort to make that happen.97
Leaking valuable BPOs and giving a decisive hand to Band of Brothers, then,
circumvents traditional ways of gaining wealth and power in the game. T20’s actions
invalidated the extraordinary lengths players go to create meaningful narratives. The
game was rigged from the development side, calling into question open nature of EVE’s
sandbox environment. Players cultivate power through the application of time and effort,
and changing the virtual world itself to change the balance of that power illustrated the
corruption players felt was rampant within CCP. The company’s response only
reinforced feelings of player powerlessness: banning the player who brought the
allegations to light, deletion of forum threads, locking and censoring community
reactions.98 “The whitewashing, crowd control and censorship would have made Stalin
proud,” described the spy Kugutsumen. “I was shocked to find that CCP’s response was
much more vindictive than concerned, and as far as was possible they swept it under the
rug instead of being forthcoming.”99 As far as CCP was concerned, the creation of an
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internal affairs bureau settled the matter and the specifics should not be open to public
scrutiny.100
After months of unrest over feelings of player powerlessness, CEO Hilmar
Pétursson decided to give the players a formal say in the shape of their world with the
reintroduction of the Council of Stellar Management (CSM). Envisioned as an elected
player council, the CSM would serve as a formal communication channel between the
community and CCP. Pétursson hoped that the CSM would help provide independent
oversight and restore some measure of consumer confidence. As Pétursson would
describe:
Perception is reality, and if a substantial part of our community feels like
we are biased, whether it is true or not, it is true to them. EVE Online is
not a computer game. It is an emerging nation, and we have to address it
like a nation being accused of corruption… A government can’t just keep
saying, “We are not corrupt.” No one will believe them. Instead you have
to create transparency and robust institutions and oversight in order to
maintain the confidence of the population.101
While Pétursson knew that there was “not so much that CCP can do in controlling their
world,” he foresaw the role of CCP and other companies that maintain virtual worlds as
“more like governments than gods.”102 By changing the narrative to speak of EVE not as
a computer game but as an “emerging nation,” Pétursson put forth the image that CCP
was ready to take player concerns seriously and answer those concerns on the terms set
by the players themselves.103 Not only was he looking to create an independent body to
help address future concerns of corruption, but to form an institution to serve as a buffer
to actively manage the concerns of his growing population. A player governance
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structure would provide direct product feedback on CCP’s actions to the company,
allowing developers to “really [drill] down to the root of any issues that arise.”104 This
served the twin goals of allowing players to express their concerns and to potentially
incorporate them into a higher quality product.
The Council of Stellar Management was announced to players in November 2007
at Fanfest, EVE Online’s annual fan convention, amid great company fanfare. Wellknown industry designers Richard Bartle and Jessica Mulligan were invited to give talks
on the prospect of democracy in EVE Online to the player base and designers alike.105
The CSM’s design was outlined to players in a 25-page founding document, the CSM
White Paper, and distributed to players. This outlined its structure and the urgent call for
citizen action.106 Player and designer feedback was incorporated into the final structure,
and the first elections were held in May 2008.107
The council was originally composed of nine members and a number of alternates
elected by popular vote. Representatives were elected for a six month term, which
contained one trip to Iceland, where CCP Headquarters is located, for a face-to-face
summit with CCP developers. A limit of two consecutive terms per person was imposed.
Some of these structural considerations were changed during CSM4 and implemented
with the election of CSM5 and CSM8. 14 players are now elected, and alternates are not
distinguished from regular candidates. CSMs now serve for one year, without term
limits, and seven candidates—the two top vote recipients, as well as five candidates
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selected internally for their efforts on the council and expertise in particular game
features—are flown to Iceland twice a year.108
Candidates were initially selected through simple popular vote. However, due to
concerns of disenfranchisement, the CSM is now elected through a Single Transferable
Vote system as of CSM8.109 In order to make the general election ballot, players must
receive 200 endorsements in a special pre-election. During the actual election, voters
select 14 candidates in order of preference out of all possible candidates. After the
ballots have been cast, the information is then processed to determine the candidates.
Extra votes are “transferred” to where they can be of best use.110 For example, should a
candidate receive more than a sufficient number of votes to secure a council seat, the
extra votes are transferred from that candidate to the next candidate on a voter’s
preference list. The same logic is followed if a candidate receives too few votes to be
elected.
While elections may be promoted through the game login screen, online videos,
or blog posts by developers, the mechanisms of the CSM are kept separate from the game
itself. While this limits the visibility of the CSM, it is by deliberate design and is in
keeping with the sandbox mentality that drives EVE’s gameplay. Players are provided
with the tools for governance, and effort is required to put those tools to best use. This
allows players the maximum amount of freedom with the minimum amount of required
participation. Those individuals that put forth the additional effort are rewarded with the
influence and access that a seat on the CSM confers.
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Theoretical Underpinnings
To help build the framework needed for a player government that would meet the
needs of EVE’s player base, Pétursson approached Pétur Jóhannes Óskarsson, also
known as CCP Xhagen, to helm the project.111 Among the many challenges facing CCP
Xhagen was getting the player base to accept the tool that it had been given. The
community had not asked for a player government; rather it was established to restore
consumer confidence after the T20 incident. Genuine democracy relied upon engaged
citizenry to make informed decisions about the institutions that play a role in their
lives.112 This is difficult to achieve if your citizens believe your government to be corrupt
or have no relevance to their lives. Therefore it was crucial for EVE players to see the
CSM as a logical way to prevent further developer misconduct and make the desires of
player base known to CCP management, while encouraging the values EVE’s society had
been built upon.
In the CSM White Paper, CCP Xhagen discusses the evolution of EVE’s social
structures as one might discuss the development of offline civilizations. Modeling his
analysis after Rousseau’s “state of nature,” CCP Xhagen argues that individuals are
motivated by the “pursuit of value, the core of which is driven by their instinct of
survival.”113 The general development of EVE’s society progressed from disconnected
individuals banding together for survival to the larger and more complex social structures
necessary to pursue the greatest resources within the game.
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In order to continue to progress beyond the competition imposed by smaller,
regional governance structures, CCP Xhagen asserts that EVE’s population must
participate in the governance of that society.114 While Rousseau uses his imagined ideal
society to argue that a republic is the best form of governance, CCP Xhagen argues that
to achieve “continued success, EVE’s society must be granted a larger role in exerting
influence on the legislative powers of CCP.”115 Since EVE’s entire society is contained
within the infrastructure provided by CCP, decisions at the development level—such as
those that came into question in the T20 scandal—become the fetters that hold back
EVE’s society from further growth. The interplay between the architecture and the social
relationships that maintain that architecture becomes the place from which this new
government must develop. To preserve the nature of that sociotechnical framework,
EVE’s citizens must be afforded freedom from external influence, unlimited interaction
with individuals, and participation in game legislation.
The idea of a player-elected government had been around since 2001, and the first
incarnation of the idea was implemented by acting-community manager Valery Massey
shortly after EVE’s release in 2003.116 The original CSM was deemed unsuccessful due
to the homogeneity of candidates, lack of formal negotiation processes, and insufficient
time on behalf of CCP.117 As one developer would tell me, what the original version of
the CSM lacked was a framework of action. “There was a lot of talking and ideas going
back and forth, but what do you do then? There was no real structure, no real framework
and hence no accountability.” The challenge for CCP Xhagen was to find such a
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framework for a legislative body that could ensure the freedoms demanded by the player
base, meet the needs of a virtual society, and be adapted into CCP’s current business
model.
There are few examples to follow when bringing democracy to virtual worlds; the
most notable exception, other than the first iteration of the CSM, is LambdaMOO. In this
case, players were granted a system of limited democracy to address player grievances
after the previous autocratic system proved inadequate to deal with virtual crime.118
While the developers eventually reclaimed their powers of control from players, they left
in the election system in place as a way of polling community opinion.119
What was missing from LambdaMOO’s failed democracy was a way of reaching
community consensus before issues were raised to the development team.120 Fostering
discussion among community members would provide direction for player suggestions
and discontent, focus consensus, and provide the methodological framework that the
previous iteration of the CSM lacked. This would foster democratic discussion and
preserve the freedoms necessary for EVE’s thriving sandbox universe. For CCP Xhagen,
the answer was deliberative democracy.
Built around the ideas of classical theorists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
John Stuart Mill, CCP Xhagen defines deliberative democracy as:
…a hybrid governance solution which combines consensus decree with
representative authority. In this system, every individual is considered
equal and has the right to voice an opinion whose relevance carries just as
much weight as every other voice in society.121
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Deliberative democracy is founded on the idea that the “individual is rational, able and
willing to spend time to reach an enlightened conclusion.”122 Multiple views are seen as
a strength as the interplay of rational actors that generates political reason through
discussion.123 This focus on intense discussion illustrates the hope that “the final
conclusion of a deliberation should be that all participants leave the table in
agreement.”124 The model hinges on open and informed discussion on behalf of the
citizenry, and a “general agreement about the Deweyan belief in social intelligence and
the hope that we ‘think best when we think together.’”125 As CCP Xhagen describes, “the
consensus of deliberative minds and the open discourse of issues will be the primary
vehicle of political change within society.”126
However, a true deliberative democracy is not possible due to the technical
limitations of working within a virtual environment. As such, the implementation of the
“concept will rest more upon representative individuals to steer a common voice.”127
Proposals are submitted over the official EVE forums, and debated within the
community. Theoretically, consensus is reached by the player base through rational
discourse. These proposals are then voted on by the CSM, and passed along to the
development team at CCP. While this model has evolved as the CSM has grown as an
institution, these two ideas—deliberative discourse between players and the ability of
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elected officials to communicate effectively—fundamentally underpin the CSM
concept.128
Consensus-building discourse and representing player ideas to CCP also answered
the challenges that arose from the T20 scandal. The CSM was “intended to have more of
an oversight role,” described one informant, “…making sure CCP stays transparent and
communicative during ‘scandals.’” Delivering the voice of the player base to CCP when
it was most needed would help include that voice within CCP’s discussions, and function
to keep CCP’s operations transparent. This aimed to keep the corruption that was at the
heart of the T20 scandal from repeating itself; in the words of CEO Hilmar Pétursson, the
CSM was to “call bullshit” on CCP when necessary.129 As CCP Xhagen described, the
CSM can:
…look at every nook and cranny and get to see that we are here to run this
company on a professional basis…They can see that we did not make this
game to win it.130
From the development side, consensus building serves to concentrate player
feedback. Forums and other traditional forms of feedback have “poor signal-to-noise
ratio,” making it hard to understand the player perspective and assess problems.131 By
reaching a general agreement on game-related problems, this allows the CSM to relay the
most critical information to CCP. The CSM becomes an outlet and a direction for player
feedback and discontent. According to one informant, players often seek out the CSM
when “something that really pisses them off!” As the first point of contact, the CSM
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often gets the “invariably thankless task” of acting as a filter between the players and
CCP. This allows only the most constructive feedback to reach developers.

Deliberative Democracy in Practice
“The CSM is not an effective democracy at all.”
It was late fall, and I was gathering information from EVE’s wide satellite
network of forums, blogs, podcasts, radio stations, and websites. I had left Skype open
on my laptop as I worked. Several interested informants had given me their Skype IDs
along with the open invitation to send them a message should I see them online. Skype
has a tendency to crash my laptop, necessitating fieldwork on two computers at once;
focused on another monitor, I almost missed one such informant login over the industrial
music that was playing on EVE Radio.132
“You have democratic masturbation of the parliamentary paradigm of voting on
this and that, and then having that go nowhere,” described my informant. This is a
sentiment I have heard many times from different CSMs. Citing ineffectiveness in
procedure, CSM6 abolished weekly meetings and voting on proposals; a Skype channel
facilitated constant communication and directives were passed by common consensus. I
am reminded of the frustration felt by many of the early CSMs in their seeming inability
to affect change within CCP; as one CSM3 representative famously begged CCP, “Please
use us!”133
“One of the things that I would actually worry about with your thesis is…buying
too much into the company line,” cautioned my informant. “[CCP has] marketing people
132
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who spend their time constantly talking up the CSM, and it is this big amazing space
parliament. It is part of their marketing spiel.” I sipped my coffee and carefully
considered what my informant said. Many people I talked to about the CSM had indeed
repeated company rhetoric. They are proud of EVE’s ability to push the boundaries of
what is possible within virtual worlds.
“I think that it is very dangerous to buy into that uncritically which is what I was
worried about when you first mentioned this project, because it is like studying
democracy and councils in space,” advised my informant. “It is not really a democracy.
It is not a very effective council, and most of what people say about it is not borne out by
the facts.”
My informant is right to be cautious. There has always been a great divide
between what the CSM actually accomplishes and how it is perceived by the community.
Much of the crisis of legitimacy the CSM faces can be traced back to the fact that what is
said of the CSM and what is done by the CSM do not always match up.134 Part of this is
due to the non-disclosure act (NDA) under which the CSM operates.135 “We are NDA
not allowed to preempt CCP [by] announcing features,” describes Gregory Russo. “If we
come out after CCP has announced something and say we contributed heavily to this or
were a driving force behind it, then we’re engaging is sleazy politics or trying to claim
credit for CCP’s work.”136 With unprecedented access to features that are still indevelopment, such an agreement is understandable; however as Scaurus notes, “the
restrictiveness of the NDA that the CSM is subject to also limits the ability for them to
134
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communicate with the player base.”137 These help to maintain the disconnect between
what is said about the CSM and its capabilities by CCP, the CSM itself, and the
expectations of the player base.
While this is consistent in a sandbox universe where the onus is on the player base
to seek out information and make best use of the tools it is given, there is a fundamental
disconnect of a theoretical sort as well. The underpinnings of the CSM lay with
deliberative democracy and the ability for the community to reach a consensus through
rational discourse. The way actual consensus is generated and used within the EVE
community is not always so reasoned. In speaking of the elections process, one
informant describes:
There is a huge segment of people in Eve who believe wholeheartedly in
the Enlightenment, and have never heard of cognitive flaws. They think
that people are programmed by reason, like they read the candidate thread,
and they think through the issues, and what have you, and people come to
a rational, unemotional decision as to who is the correct person to vote for.
Similar objections could be applied to the method of generating community discussion.
As originally designed, players were encouraged to submit petitions to the Assembly
Hall, a special CSM section of EVE’s official forums. This allows players to open
discussion on areas of the game they feel need developer attention. These petitions were
then voted on by the CSM and passed on to CCP.
Voting on these petitions was abolished by later CSMs, as measures passed by the
CSM were merely added to the development backlog. Bluntly described one player, “the
Assembly Hall is a shithole.”138 As it functions now, the Assembly Hall serves to
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perpetuate the idea that the CSM has the ability to force CCP to make changes it
demands:
[Players] think that if they if they propose the right Assembly Hall
proposal, people will vote on it. And then there will be magic, and CCP
will do whatever is in there. In practice, the Assembly Hall should be shut
down. It should be merged with the Features and Ideas forum, which is
already basically the same thing, but the Features and Ideas forum doesn’t
have this illusion that you can have a CSM vote and then CCP will just do
what you say.139
Good ideas got buried in favor of ideas that may be unfeasible or unworkable within the
confines of EVE’s current architecture. Many of the CSMs I spoke with had simply
stopped reading the forums. While this was not universally the case, many CSMs made
the distinction between getting feedback and getting good feedback. Screening through
hundreds of forum threads of questionable value takes a tremendous amount of time.
Instead, many CSMs suggested that a concerned player should email them directly with
their ideas, or send a link to a good proposal. CSMs would then discuss matters in which
players took the extra effort to bring their ideas to the CSMs attention.
While this cuts down on the work of a CSM—which is a significant time
investment now that communication with CCP and other CSMs is done in real time—it
also stifles the discussion that is necessary to the function of a true deliberative
democracy. The consensus of the community is less often examined than individuals
who take the time and effort to make their ideas heard. Sending ideas directly to the
CSM leaves the rest of the community out of the discussion entirely. Other CSMs took
an even more informal approach, taking their cues from informal discussions over Jabber
or Mumble; while any community discussions are those a CSM should indeed be
listening to, these discussions generally occur within an alliance with similar ideas about
139
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what is important in the game rather than true discussions that span the whole of the EVE
community. These informal chat channels are often made up of the constituents that
elected the representative in the first place. As one player describes, “If the mandate is to
do what the constituents ask, but you have told the constituents what to ask for, then the
society as a whole is no longer served.”140
Forum submissions as the primary vehicle for discussion also have additional
weaknesses. Within EVE, forums are a powerful way of manipulating public opinion,
which prove as a subtle means of control by individual actors rather than actual
discussion that generates community consensus. Threadnoughts are one such tool of
persuasion for shaping public discussions. A threadnought is a forum post with many
replies. In general, topics that generate the most discussion are controversial and serve as
outlets for player rage, dismay, aggression, etc., to which a CSM would be likely to take
cues from. The name is a play on words between a forum “thread” and a “dreadnought,”
one of the largest ships in EVE. While slow and cumbersome to navigate, dreadnoughts
have immense firepower that can lay siege to the largest player structures in the game, the
player-owned starbase or POS.141 With effective use, a dreadnought can change the
course of a war. Similarly, the slow but successful change of public opinion over the
forums can be as formidable of a weapon as the largest ships. Actual substantive
discussion can get lost amid hundreds of replies, but critical debate is not the goal.
Readers see the number of replies, read the initial post, and reply. Forum mechanics
dictate that posts are sequential, and newer posts are added to the back of the discussion.

140

(Paritybit 2011)
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These allow corporations a wide range of benefits such as research opportunities, manufacturing facilities, moon
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A thorough reading of hundreds of responses is time consuming and often skipped.
Public opinion relies on social interaction for its proof, and the initial post provides the
social cue that defines most individuals’ view on the topic.142 One recent threadnought
on player-owned starbases shows frequent edits to the first post, as the CSM poster tries
vainly to steer the discussion back on a productive course. This also reasserts the
authority of the CSM to drive the discussion of POSes and use their own version of the
truth to shape the discussion.143
This moves the CSM farther away from incorporating the opinions of a wide
cross section of the player base. While there are wide discrepancies between the
implementation and the theoretical ideas behind the CSM, the reality seems to be that
“consensus of deliberative minds and the open discourse of issues” is less often the
primary vehicle of political change within EVE’s society.144 While this makes the CSM
a less-than-perfect deliberative democracy, the CSM is often seen as an invaluable
sounding board for development ideas due to their shared breadth of in-game knowledge.
This is reinforced by their experience as well as the broad networks of players that
generally help them come into power. Described one developer, CSM representatives
are:
…super users. They have gone through much of the game before they
actually come to the position…Their knowledge of the game, and their
view, and their understanding of the whole of EVE is a much stronger one
rather than just the casual player.
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These experiences and networks of players help to inform depth of knowledge in a few
key areas, which in turn the CSM as they lobby for game changes. In a universe as broad
as EVE, this helps to keep the advice given by the CSM to developers grounded in game
experience rather than speculation. This grounding in action and time served will do
much to generate a sense of legitimacy for the CSM, as it finds the limits of its
architected powers and strives to work around those limitations.
While a “participatory democracy relies on the ability of citizens to make
informed decisions rather than to choose between elites to make decisions for them,”
reaching out to that broad player base is more difficult.145 Asks one player, “if some
players care too much, other players don’t care at all and some players haven’t even
started playing yet, what is the way forward? How do we represent players who don’t
care to be represented?”146

Conclusion
For EVE, the answer is unclear. Voter turnout peaked at an all-time high of
16.63% during the CSM7 election; only 12.12% of the eligible voters cast ballots

during the election for CSM8.147 Low efficacy and impact of the CSM can be attributed
to a variety of factors. From a design standpoint, the CSM is considered merely another
tool of many provided to players in a sandbox environment. To most players, EVE is a
game; justifying the need for an elected council to more casual players who only login a
few hours a week can be difficult. Understanding elections detracts from time that could
be spent engaging in EVE activities that are a good deal more fun. For now, the ability of
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the CSM to influence CCP generally rests with those players that are more fully invested
in the game and its virtual society. And while this circumvents the original design of the
CSM’s democratic processes, it also allows the EVE players willing to put in the effort
access to the tools of governance within the world.
While these rationalizations become ways to explain the continued existence of
the CSM despite a low voter turnout, it becomes important to consider what value the
CSM offers to CCP. In CCP’s newest game, DUST 514, a similar institution is already
being created; the Council of Planetary Management is being formed from early active
players to design a player-elected institution that will function similar to the CSM.148 If
the CSM does not represent the opinions of the entire player base, what is the value of
such an institution? Why go the extra step to include it in other CCP products?

“They want to have their cake and eat it too,” continued my informant. “They
want to have the esteem of having a [virtual] democracy, because Iceland is very proud of
having the first democracy.” EVE Radio droned low in the background as my informant
extolled his skepticism of the CSM’s democratic purpose.
“In practice what is actually going on there is that the budget for the CSM project
is very low. Flying people in [to Iceland] is expensive, but they do not really have any
coding resources. So they cannot do very simple [things],” he described. “That is often
the case of companies and with humans in general. When you want to do something that
you cannot do, you concoct a reasonable-sounding excuse out of principle for why we are
not doing it.”
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I sipped my coffee and grimaced. It had long grown cold during the hours of
intense discussion. From this perspective, being able to say that the CSM exists as a way
to codify the wishes of the player base becomes more important than its actual
effectiveness. It was a sentiment I had heard before during the opening remarks of the
CSM panel at Fanfest 2011. Ágúst Ingþórsson, a CCP moderator who worked with the
early CSM, described the CSM as a “unique corporate strategy for a unique ‘product.’”149
While he admitted that he is not a player and players do not often think of their world as a
venue for marketing, “after all, CCP is a corporation.”150 CCP must attend to its own
needs, as well as those of EVE’s citizens.
“I also see it has a strong resonance in democratic theory and democratic
evolutionary practices,” Ingþórsson continued, “where the subjects, you guys, get more
and more power and are empowered to be on an equal footing with the creator.”151 The
company highlighted how EVE is challenging the idea of what is possible within virtual
worlds. This is in stark contrast to the mood within the outgoing CSM5; relationships
with CCP were beginning to break down, even as CCP was actively promoting the CSM
in their marketing releases. “[CSM5 had] an entire hour-long session…on things the
CSM could do at Fanfest to be ‘rock stars of the community.’ That was their term,”
described another informant. “They wanted us to be seen as rock stars, put us on stage,
and make a big deal… We turned around and said no. We are just players…The
community will hate us for it.”
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These corporate messages allow the myth of democracy to persist within the EVE
community. Though the influence of the CSM is growing within CCP through its new
corporate stakeholder status—a role granted by CCP to officially include the CSM in the
decision-making process—the actual power of the CSM is poorly understood within the
community. The sharing and telling of these corporate narratives foster the illusion that
players are indeed “empowered to be on an equal footing with the creator.”152
The introduction of a player-elected council could be taken as little more than a
public relations stunt, a panacea to prevent further financial losses from occurring after
the T20 incident. As one player described:
“[In my opinion,] the CSM is a marketing stunt, its [sic] primary value is
in CCP being able to place a series of ‘look, democratic player
representation in our MMO’ interviews in the gaming press once per year
and actual feedback gathering from players could be done far more
efficiently in private, hand-selected focus groups.153
While it is hard to know CCP’s true intentions behind such a move, the effect is that the
idea of governance becomes commodified as another feature in a cutting edge MMO.
This is consistent with EVE’s sandbox design—where the fewest number of tools are
offered to players and they create their own adventures—but it also reinforces the power
that CCP has over its subscribers. The creation of an apparent public sphere for the
discussion and rational debate sells players on the idea of the contributions they could
make to EVE’s virtual society.
The question the becomes what power the CSM actually confers within EVE’s
society, and the way EVE’s culture shapes and constrains the form that power might take.
In the next chapter, we will discuss EVE’s cultural ideas about democracy, which can
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help us understand the resistance to democratic processes, and why players may willingly
allow the broad discourse necessary for a deliberative democracy to be silenced. These
cultural ideas will illustrate the some routes to power within EVE, and what happens
when CCP must contend with the institution it has created on their own terms.
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Chapter III: Power
Introduction
“Democracy? In my EVE? LOL! The CSM is [like the] democracy of ancient
Greece, where every senator had a dozen of slaves in their garden.”
Logged into the EVE client, I chatted with one of the many informants I
interviewed over the course of my fieldwork. In the real world, I sat in the teaching
assistant office of my university where the internet connection is strong. It was an early
fall evening and the sun has already set. I had the communal office to myself. The vague
feeling of disquiet that accompanies staying late and alone on campus was for once
warranted. In game, I was docked in a station in a quiet corner of New Eden far from the
station I had been using as home base. My informant requested that we use the EVE
client for the interview in case CCP would want to question what was said between us. I
had been caught somewhat unawares and docked in the closest station. Outside my home
territory, chatting with a bountied pilot, alone on campus after hours, I wondered if CCP
was listening.154
“EVE plays democracy on a top level in CSM, but if you would [look] at the ingame politics, there is no democracy. It’s a feudal life.”
“How is EVE like a feudal society, rather than a democracy?” I asked.
Skepticism of democratic processes is widespread in EVE, and larger alliances tend to
operate as dictatorships. It was a sentiment I heard repeated by many players.
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Bounties may be placed on a pilot, corporation, or alliance to pay a reward to a pilot that destroys the target’s ship.
This may be done for any number of reasons, and has been recently revamped in an attempt to entice players to see
bounty hunting as a viable in-game profession. See (CCP SoniClover 2012).
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“Democracy is not [an] effective tool during the war. This is a time for generals
and dictators. If any member would have to vote for any decision, the alliance would
react too slowly,” my informant explained. “If alliance resources would be managed by
[the] public, spies would know your possibilities. So any alliance that tries to build a
democratic community would have a disadvantage and tend to fall apart during the war…
The game design itself supports the tyranny.”
“If EVE supports tyranny among player alliances, does that mean a democracy
like the CSM isn’t appropriate for EVE?” I asked.
“That’s the thing that still [has] no clear answer. Feudal kingdoms send their
representatives to the democratic CSM to decide the game evolution. This is natural for
any of them to save the power they have. But on the other hand, they have to work on a
game design that would probably try to destroy them,” my informant explained. “CSM is
a democracy for the large alliance leaders, not for players.”
Looking out the window of my office, I wondered for a moment what CCP might
think. When I had broached the subject with developers earlier in my fieldwork, they
echoed my informant’s remarks. “The CSM is filled with super users,” one remarked.
“Because they are super users, they have gone through much of the game before they
actually come to the position… Their understanding of the whole of Eve is a much
stronger one rather than just the casual player.” This almost implies that those who can
take power on the CSM should do so, for EVE is best served by their passion,
organization, and experience. As the interview moves to other things, I wonder if, as my
informant had implied, CCP was indeed listening to our conversation. As another former
developer would later confirm, “That old phrase of ‘the logs show nothing?’ That is
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bullshit. They can see everything that happens in this game. Every single thing in this
game.”155

For the EVE community, power and authority are deeply interrelated. The ability
to deliver results translates serves to legitimate authority, regardless of the means used to
produce particular ends. The power to command such action is, in part, what confers the
authority on which that action is dependent. Following Weber, power can be defined as
“the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal
action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.”156 As
within Weber’s work, this hinges on the cultivation of power-oriented prestige, which
confers power gains for the CSM as a political entity in the eyes of the community.157
The striving for power and the authority that is conferred by that power are bound
within EVE’s cultural and behavioral norms. These have emerged over the last decade as
a consequence of many of the in-game power structures being at a constant state of war.
A cultural preference for authoritarian power structures, for example, arises due to the
lack of responsiveness of democratic organizations; alliances with hundreds of voices to
take into account cannot respond swiftly to changing in-game conditions. A reliance on
rule-governed processes—such as voting on petitions—allows too many inputs into
decisions; this leaves an organization open to attack from the inside through espionage.
These ideas are further shaped by EVE’s status as a game that is supposed to provide the
maximum amount of fun to its players.
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These same logics shape how the CSM is perceived and accepted by the
community. To the casual observer, the power that the CSM placed in the community’s
hands sounded very much like what they had demanded after the T20 incident: a place
where the voice of the people could be heard, community expectations defined, and have
those desires acknowledged by CCP. However, as originally designed, the Council of
Stellar Management served only as a sounding board for community opinion.158 The
CSM lacks the ability to enforce those changes from CCP. As CCP Xhagen describes:
Currently the players, of course, don’t have a direct say…CCP is a
company, and a company that needs money to survive… We cannot
actually allow the players to take that control out of our hands, but the
power of suggestion, and the refined ideas, and the concerns players have
are of course important to us. So in a way they control although they
don’t have an actual vote on the matter.159
The CSM’s lack of actual power was lost neither on players nor on industry
speaker Richard Bartle, whom CCP had invited to speak at Fanfest about the possibilities
of virtual governance:
It doesn’t matter how much you try and tell the players that they have
the power, they don’t. You have the power. And they have the power just
so long as they do exactly what you want, but the truth is that the minute
they do something that you don’t want, they don’t have the power
anymore.160
For some players, this gave the CSM the feeling of high school elections where the only
criteria was student popularity; one player described it as a “Galactic United Nations,”
which was a “step down from student council level, since at least the student council had
the power to choose the themes for the homecoming dance and the prom.”161
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The skepticism of the EVE community is a two-fold problem. Without the tools
to affect community-desired changes in the game, lack of perceivable results weakens the
CSM’s authority to speak for the player base. While these two subjects—power and
authority—are deeply interrelated for EVE’s players, the CSM’s lack of institutionalized
power is a serious barrier to gaining any recognition within the community. As such, we
will first examine how power is organized and conceptualized within the EVE
community. These emergent gameplay mechanics become the grounding for how the
CSM works around this lack of official power. The authority conferred by these methods
and how they are understood within cultural skepticism of democratic processes is
examined in Chapter IV.

Power Centers within EVE Online
According to the official wiki, the ultimate goal of EVE Online “is power. It can
be power over the market, military dominance, financial power, or political power.”162
After a decade of game play, much of this power is concentrated within older alliances.
“There are established powers out there,” described one player. “There are very, very
large power blocs. There are whole businesses with insulate responsibilities and profit
functions that have existed for years.”163 Corporations may band together into formal
alliances that work together to control vast sections of space; these are generally out in
null security or 0.0 space, lawless areas in which corporations are allowed to maintain ingame sovereignty over their territory. Alliances may contain thousands of individual
players working together for a common goal. These influential power blocs are often
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organized around particular styles of gameplay, and these common objectives serve to
orient alliance behavior within the game’s larger narratives.
“Breaking up many of those coalitions has been the largest player generated
content in the game,” suggested one player. “In the end, EVE is all about war, be it
economic or military. It's not surprising that an elected council for a game like EVE also
mirrors the most active content generators in the game.”164 With large amounts of
territory and resources, alliances go to great lengths to protect their in-game interests.
The CSM is seen as one way to serve those interests, by maintaining or enhancing
gameplay mechanics that best serve an alliance’s needs.165 As such, larger alliances often
put forward a particular CSM candidate to represent their voice to CCP. Often these
candidates are well-known members of the community, where their in-game exploits give
them credibility, prestige, and depth of knowledge that will be useful in shaping the
direction of the game.
While this is not to imply that the CSM is made up entirely of large alliance
candidates, getting elected without the high degree of organization and coordination an
alliance can provide is sometimes difficult. Players have tried to organize themselves
into political parties—the Rational Party and the Take Care party that represented high
security players have been the most active—to varying degrees of success, taking cues
from real life politics to build voter support.166 Other CSMs I spoke to ran as
independent candidates; one CSM was intrigued by the concept of a “more structured
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group that would gather player feedback.” Another sought to spread world values into
EVE Online through the CSM’s contact with players. At least one CSM member is
regarded to have scammed his way onto the council solely for a trip to Iceland.167 These
players considered their time on the CSM with varying degrees of satisfaction; however,
others were skeptical of “random bloggers, high sec care bears, people who do not really
have much of a following” running for the CSM.168
While these movements did attract players, the problem comes in recruiting those
that are less connected to the grander narratives within the EVE community. These
players may not read the official forums where much of the information gets
disseminated, and illustrating how political representation affects their daily life in EVE
is less clear.169 For casual players that only log in a few hours a week, EVE is only a
game; those casual players I spoke with considered the effort required to get elected or
vote for the CSM to be taking the game too seriously. This leaves out additional
perspectives when CCP is looking for feedback on the direction the game should take.
For developers, however, the fact that some EVE players’ voices are left out of
the CSM representation is not a huge concern. In discussing the new voting system that
went into effect with CSM8, one developer argued that “what I want is not actually fair
representation of ALL EVE players, but of THOSE WHO VOTE (it follows from there
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that the more people that vote, the better representation we get.)”170 In keeping with
EVE’s sandbox design which places few restrictions on player action, he also argued that
if “large numbers of people organize themselves, they will get better results than those
who do not.”171 As one developer would tell me, the democracy within EVE is kept “as
Eve-ish as possible,” and no actions are forbidden to attain seats on the CSM. The CSM
becomes another tool which may be sought if players desire it. Those power blocs that
are able to organize and seek the CSM as a way shape the game in their favorable are
welcome to do so.
According to one informant, the “CSM tends to only have player focus when the
blocs pay attention to it.” As the large power blocs drive EVE’s emergent game play, so
too does the CSM provide a venue for those power dynamics. In EVE, power comes to
those that can command action and results, and maintain that power across alliances of
thousands of individuals. A seat on the CSM would seem to be a logical choice. Larger
alliances have more at stake as they have greater resources to protect, and shaping
gameplay mechanics could ensure profitable outcomes. It may be a beneficial strategy to
encourage stagnation of gameplay mechanics, since these mechanics are what brought
about their rise to power in the first place.172 Such charges have indeed been leveled at
the CSM; as one pilot angrily described, the “CSM has no problem with lack of
gameplay, as long as it furthers their own goals.”173

170

(CCP Xhagen 2012)
(CCP Xhagen 2012)
172
(Edelman 2001:71)
173
(Jade 2012)
171

64
The Power of Persuasion
However, the CSM does not have power to enforce CCP to make changes desired
by the player base, regardless of the size of the collective interest.174 Up until the
structural changes that were implemented with CSM5, the CSM was run under a
parliamentary paradigm. As one informant would cynically describe, “They have these
meetings. They vote on proposals from the Assembly Hall section on the forums, and
then that gets added to a bucket list that CCP ignores.” If there is only an “intrinsic
source of power” in the CSM, as another source would suggest, then what is gained by a
seat on the CSM? What does the CSM offer to large alliances that battle over the small
number of seats?
Without formal power to command such changes, the CSM evolved different
methods to work around these challenges. When CSMs talk about the power they have,
they speak about access. Describes Hans Jagerblitzen:
We can’t force CCP to do anything. We don't have hard power. We don’t
“manage” the players, and we don’t “manage” CCP’s messaging… But
we do have an audience with CCP, and we provide an audience for player
concerns. Influence is our greatest asset, and it is earned, not granted.175
The ability to persuade CCP development staff becomes the primary way in which the
CSM can work around the constraints placed by the CSM’s framework. The CSM is now
referred to as a “conduit between CCP and the EVE Online player base,” and a Skype
channel allows for “constant deliberation” between developers and CSM
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representatives.176 This has been further enhanced by making the CSM a stakeholder in
the design process, which allows for access with a wider variety of actors within the
development staff.177 As CSM7 Chairman Seleene would describe of the stakeholder
status, “if the CSM itself doesn’t have any real power or sway or ability to interact with
CCP closer than it has in the past, then none of that was going to matter.”178
Persuasion has a long been a part of EVE’s political machinations. When the rise
and fall of large corporations drives EVE’s emergent game play, confidence tricks and
espionage are some of the most common ways to engineer their downfall. Both of these
rely on the ability of an individual to influence and persuade others that they are who they
claim to be. “Trust is the most valuable commodity in EVE, because it is literally
priceless,” describes one player.179 “You are taking a chance when you trust someone in
EVE…in that you have to be prepared on that trust being betrayed.” Convincing others
that you are trustworthy enough to be given access to corporation secrets, your operations
are legitimate, your information is credible is always a gamble. The deeper that you
allow other people into your corporation, the more access they have to the operations,
fortunes, and resources; the further you trust others with access, the greater the
opportunity for a betrayal.
Many examples of such betrayals have passed into EVE legend. For example, the
assassination of Mirial, the CEO of Ubiqua Seraph, took ten months to set up, and
resulted in the seizure of assets of $16,500 US worth of virtual goods.180 The
assassination was carried out by the Guiding Hand Social Club, one of EVE’s most
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notorious mercenary corporations. Mirial was persuaded to fly a Navy Apocalypse,
worth billions of ISK, into remote space, and was in turn assassinated by her closest
lieutenant; the only prize that the client requested was Mirial’s frozen corpse, and the rest
of the take was kept by the Guiding Hand Social Club.181 In another of EVE’s famous
scandals, a simple Ponzi scheme run by Eddie Lampert and Mordor Exuel netted
$51,677.50 US worth of ISK.182 These types of treachery have become a routine part of
daily life.
Persuasion within EVE can also be used to involve other corporations and players
within the emergent gameplay. “It’s a single server. That’s the big thing. It’s a shared
universe,” described CSM1 Chairman Jade Constantine:
We are playing space games. We play imaginary characters in a far future
setting, but the imagery in this game is very rich…If you can somehow tie
your own political struggles into that mythology, you can get a very
impressive competitive advantage… [Our corporation was] able to sell the
mythology of conflict to the broader server by using public relations, by
involving third party corporations, and just by making it an exciting
fight.183
Since all of EVE exists within the same virtual space, larger conflicts can involve all of
the players within the game. A large war affects the supply and demand of resources and
technology, allows for war profiteering, involves large numbers of people, and can
perhaps allow for other smaller corporations to seize territory while attentions are
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directed elsewhere. By selling a convincing account, corporations can persuade others to
rally to their cause, rise against them, or even diffuse the conflict altogether.
“A lot of the game revolves around propaganda and the skillful deployment of
that propaganda. Controlling the narrative” can be a powerful advantage, describes
CSM6 Chairman The Mittani.184 The power to frame the interpretation of public events
is part of what drives EVE’s politics. Public opinion is a social construction, and
opinions are framed by the “interpretations of those who can most consistently get their
claims and manufactured cues publicized widely.”185 Because of EVE’s single server,
the ability to shape that discussion can change the course of events for EVE’s entire
population. Getting your alliance’s version of events publicized is crucial to shaping
outcomes in your favor; alternatively, restricting discussion on an issue can be similarly
powerful.
According to Cialdini, relying on such social cues “provides a convenient shortcut
for determining how to behave but, at the same time, makes one who uses the shortcut
vulnerable to profiteers who lie in wait along its path.”186 These profiteers are those who
best know how to use players’ reliance on socially validated truths, and the specific areas
social cues that might be influenced for greatest effect. This helps to illustrated some of
the cultural skepticism of democratic process that persists in EVE; the greater input and
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transparency involved in the mechanisms and governance of an institution, the more
obvious the weaknesses in that system become.
“This is the sort of game where you have to bring everything that you can to a
conflict or engagement or situation,” describes The Mittani. “If you are holding yourself
back you might be that guy who has a lot of e-honor, but you will still be a loser and ehonor is a cold comfort.”187 While this comment relates to the necessity of espionage, the
point applies more broadly to the political machinations of EVE. Those alliances and
corporations that are the most effective, respected, and feared are those that bring all tools
to the table in any given situation. Effective leadership uses all available methods to
deliver results, and the ability to persuade others to use those skills is what makes EVE
leaders truly powerful.
It is important to remember that there is no moral code or rules built into EVE’s
cultural landscape. “The only rules that are there are those that can be broken,” described
The Mittani.188 In keeping with EVE’s sandbox universe, the only limits are those
players place on themselves. Actions that are kept within the confines of the game are
seen as morally neutral, and it is only when the methods begin to blur the boundaries
between the game world and the real that they become questionable.189 According to the
developers I spoke with, this is a conscious design choice. Described one developer, if
EVE relied on real world rules to govern the behavior within it:
…you no longer have a different experience when you come into it. What
is a virtual universe other than a different experience for you to have?
What would be enticing about our universe to come into?
187
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The ability of the CSM to influence developers falls directly into that ambiguous
area between the real world and the virtual. While a true separation between the real and
the virtual in practice does not exist, the CSM is expected to abide by the cultural
expectations of both realms.190 While is crucial for CSM representatives to be able to
find common ground with the development teams, it is important to understand “that
player perspective and [developer] perspective are two very different things… The CSM
has to reconcile both points of view.”191 CSM representatives are elected with the
expressed purpose of representing player concerns, and operate from this perspective first
and foremost when dealing with CCP developers. As EVE players first, players operate
within a framework that operates under different cultural norms; as smart battle strategy,
players bring all available tools to any given engagement. Should a CSM fail to deliver
results or fail to lobby CCP using all available methods, the CSM is again called a
marketing ploy within the public discourse. For example, one player cynically described
the CSM’s history to me as:
…bullshit PR tool, and then bull shit PR tool finds a gun and a weak point.
Oh god. Oh god. And then they dropped the gun and it goes back to being
a bullshit PR tool.
While not all players would describe the CSM as such, its effectiveness is judged
by EVE’s cultural ideas to command results through persuasion at points of vulnerability.
Should this persuasion be insufficient to alter CCP’s course and the situation develop into
a full-fledged crisis, then the CSM becomes an even more important in representing
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player interests in extreme times that are more akin to EVE’s constant uncertainty. While
this same player would go on to suggest that the power to force CCP to change comes
from the media, I would argue that the CSM’s greatest strength is in its representatives
acting in ways that truly embody the cultural tendencies of EVE’s player base. 192
Effective CSMs are expected to act like alliance leaders and navigate that crisis in true
EVE fashion: it is time to go to war.193
Case Study: CSM6 and the Methods of Influence194
Consistent with the attitude to bring all tools to a conflict is the CSM’s
willingness to take real life considerations into their calculus when deciding how to
influence CCP. The “weak point” described by the above player was not virtual, but one
tied to the particular cultural and historical moment in which CCP found themselves
during the term of CSM6. The ability and willingness to use weaknesses beyond the
virtual into the real world is part of why CSM6 is regarded as one of the most successful
since its inception; the players involved acted as was expected of alliance leaders under
constant threat. According to CEO Hilmar Pétursson describes, “Ultimately democracies
were either from monarchs that built a parliament or it was people revolting to build a
parliament. I think these institutions were born out of dictatorship or they were disrupted
from dictatorships, and I would say we are giving the power back before it is taken.”195
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This does not imply these behaviors confer the same legitimacy for those at CCP. Describes Hans Jagerblitzen:
“…regardless of how that influence is obtained it can also be lost in a heartbeat through the representative’s behavior
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From the perspective of the players, CSM6 provided a moment when it seemed possible
for the CSM to take a measure of real power back on behalf of the players.
As a way to illustrate how the CSM can influence CCP, I will examine the
methods used by CSM6 to influence CCP to hear player concerns.196 While I did not find
universal acceptance of CSM6’s methods, most of the players I spoke to indicated it had
been the most productive council regardless of their opinion on the manner in which
those results were achieved. The extreme measures taken over the course of CSM6 are
not the only road to power. CSM7 has taken the more conservative approach of
codifying and institutionalizing the connections between CCP and the CSM through their
stakeholder position. These will be discussed in Chapter IV. However, a different sense
of authority is conferred by a community skeptical of results not immediately delivered,
transparent process that leaves institutions open to attack, and the accountability of
numerous individuals. For our purposes, CSM6 serves to highlight the ability of a CSM
to command results, despite a lack of official power.

The Incarna Expansion and the Summer of Rage
The summer of 2011 proved to be a watershed moment in terms of
communication with CCP. In what was dubbed the “Summer of Rage” by players,
internal CCP documents were leaked to the public that detailed company discussions over
the implementation of microtransactions. Microtransactions refer to the sale of in-game
virtual goods; ccording to the CSM, CCP had been preparing to institute
microtransactions as part of its upcoming Incarna expansion.
196

This does not mean that earlier iterations of the CSM were ineffective. The concept has evolved greatly in the five
years since its inception. However my fieldwork took place between April and November 2012, just after CSM6 had
left office. Therefore these two CSMs loomed large in the memory of the community and were the subject of many
hours of discussion.

72
The Incarna expansion had been five years in development and had been heavily
marketed to the player base. The new expansion primarily focused on vanity content,
rather than generating new forms of game play. Vanity content provides social prestige
rather than offering benefits to game play. Central to this approach was the introduction
of avatars; avatars are graphical representations of the user within a game universe.
Unlike most MMOs, EVE did not feature avatars. Instead, a player’s ship was the
representation within the game universe. EVE’s new highly-customizable avatars and a
new environment, the Captain’s Quarters, for the avatars to explore led to the expansion
being nicknamed “Walking in Stations” by the player base. However when EVE’s
primary focus had always been “Flying in Space,” these cosmetic upgrades were seen by
the player base as nothing more than a vehicle for to sell the new vanity content through
microtransactions, while increasing demands on computer graphics hardware.197
Moreover, there was a large discrepancy over the price points of the introduced
items. A monocle for one’s avatar—which could only be seen by others over forum
profile pictures—could be purchased for the sum of $68 US.198 These were a hard sell to
players that had up until recently had no virtual bodies at all.
The leaked company newsletter carried an article entitled “Greed is Good?”,
which proposed to expand the microtransaction model to the rest of the game; players
could possibly spend real world money for a competitive edge in combat.199 For EVE
players that invest tremendous amounts of time and effort to train their combat skills,
build alliances and corporations, and amass power and resources, being able to buy a
competitive advantage circumvents that investment. For players drawn to EVE’s
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spaceship combat and the ability to take part in the larger emergent adventures through
effort, CCP was moving farther and farther away from what players felt to be the core of
EVE’s gameplay.
While many of these features would normally have been prevented by the CSM’s
oversight, the CSM had been increasingly left out of the process. At their winter summit,
CSM5 had raised significant concerns over the shape Incarna was taking. These concerns
went unaddressed, leading CSM5 to issue an open letter to the community detailing the
growing rift between the CSM and CCP.200 This took place at the end of CSM5,
immediately before Fanfest, where the results of CSM6’s election would be announced.
Due to increased community ire and in-game protests, the decision was made to fly the
newly-elected CSM6 to Iceland for an emergency summit. According to one informant,
telling the developers that the combination of microtransactions, vanity content, and
avatars was not what the player base wanted was “like we were telling children that there
was no Santa Claus.”
Elected as the apprehensions about Incarna were beginning to emerge, CSM6 was
a fundamentally different kind of CSM in composition and demeanor. By the time
stakeholder status became codified in CSM5, many of the candidates on the CSM were
career politicians with less experience in null sec. Null security or 0.0 spaces are lawless
areas outside of the purview of the NPC police force. These spaces are the source for
some of EVE’s most active player-driven content. When CCP began to look at changing
game mechanics that governed EVE’s most compelling gameplay, CSM members did not
have experience to adequately advise CCP on how the community would react to such
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changes. 201 For example, jump bridges allow travel between two starbases; this can
facilitate safe, fast travel in dangerous territory and are seen as an integral part of life in
null sec. CCP had proposed to change the mechanics behind jump bridges; changing the
way that fundamental piece of technology works changes how major alliances exist
within that territory.202 Without experience in those spaces, the CSM’s suggestions did
not offer practical solutions from the community’s point of view. According to one
source, “the CSM was no longer merely unhelpful but had become an active detriment to
the game.”
Thus the stronger player alliances banded together to take control of the council;
those elected tended to be those with strong political ties and experienced leadership
within the stronger alliances. “We decided from day one…We are going to run this like
we run things in the game,” described Seleene of CSM6 and CSM7, “and the results
speak for themselves.”203 For much of the null sec community, the new CSM6 had
already demonstrated its ability to deliver results to the player base through time served.
It was the interest of the core null sec alliances drove the shift in public opinion. “It was
purely the power blocs, and that’s all. Its people will not shift unless they are led in a
particular way,” described one informant.
With the controversy that surrounded the Incarna release, the CSM6 behaved
much like a 0.0 alliance under wartime conditions. The swift decision-making approach
that served CSM6’s member within their alliances was applied to the council. Voting on
user-submitted forum posts was abolished. Feedback from players was primarily through
direct EVE mail, in addition to more informal chats over third-party applications such as
201
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Jabber, Skype, or Mumble.204 Weekly meetings were forgone in favor of constant
communication over a Skype channel with the developers. While the channel is
admittedly not entirely business, “a lot of things happen over the Skype channel that sort
of elude a formal process.”205 This more informal approach allows ideas to be pitched
directly to the developers who can make that happen, rather than going through official
channels.
CSM6 also worked to close their functioning from public view rather than to
make their methods transparent. A united front was presented to the public, and any
dissent was hidden behind official statements from the CSM. According to one
informant, the Chairman was:
…basically puppeteering the rest of the CSM. No one spoke unless it was
through his mouth. Nothing was transparent. No one knew what the other
CSM members were thinking, because everything that came out was “The
CSM thinks this,” and “The CSM thinks that.”
The alliances of the respective CSMs were used to propagate these messages throughout
the community, lending an air of legitimacy for members who trusted their leaders
implicitly. These tactics were so effective that according to one informant:
…living in the shadow of CSM6, which had the incredible message
machine of [the Chairman and his alliance] and a full blown crisis to use it
on, it is a bit difficult. A common complaint is that “The CSM isn’t doing
anything” or “The CSM is silent.”
These unified ideological messages tapped into the cultural expectations EVE players had
for leadership; strong unified messages helped to guide player understanding for what
they could expect from the CSM as their advocates at CCP. These ideological messages
often focused on results. As one source describes, “Once we had an accomplishment we
204
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would raise it up in front of everyone and the media.” Even though the methods of
achieving these outcomes were not open to public scrutiny, by presenting such
propagandistic tales of their accomplishments could drive the discourse in which they
were talked about in the community and in the gaming media. “We must take stern
control of the narrative there to ensure that the badposters in [the official forums] are not
heeded by anyone of consequence,” described one player.206

A Moment of Cultural Weakness
To understand the true effect of media leverage at this moment, it is necessary to
understand the other culture which shapes both EVE Online and CCP: Iceland. As EVE
Online’s culture is embedded within the technological framework of CCP, so too is CCP
embedded within its home country of Iceland. While the primary focus of this paper is
not a comparison of EVE and Icelandic cultures, the relationship between the two comes
into play through CCP as a company. The cultural similarities seep in through the
manner in which EVE is constructed, and EVE has historically been designed and
managed by largely Icelandic staff. 207 The Summer of Rage that culminated in the lay
off 20% of CCP staff worldwide staff does not have their antecedents solely in the divide

206

The Mittani, quoted by (Jarjadian 2011).
There are many more parallels between EVE culture and that of ancient Iceland than can be discussed here. For
example, ancient Iceland was characterized by a lack of centralized executive power. Should a party be wronged, it
was up to the individual to pursue the matter and enforce penalty (Karlsson 2000). Penalties were generally either
monetary or outlawry. Argues Byock, a “dependence on outlawry exempted Iceland from the need to maintain a
policing body to oversee the imposition of corporal punishment, execution, or incarceration” (1988:29). A person
could be declared an outlaw for a period of three years (fjörbaugsgarðr) or indefinitely (skóggangr). Byock further
describes that a full outlaw was “denied all assistance in Iceland; he was not to be harbored by anyone, nor could he be
helped out of the country. In effect, this punishment was tantamount to a death sentence, for a skóggangr could be
killed with impunity” (1988:29). This bears many similarities to the system of kill rights in EVE. While EVE does
maintain an NPC police force, performing an act of aggression on you or your property in high security space (or your
capsule in low security space) will generate a kill right (EVElopedia 2013). Once activated, you may pursue and kill
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traveling in space tremendously more difficult. Kill rights are active for 30 days within the game. This is only one
such similarity. While many players jokingly described EVE as “Spreadsheets in Space” due to the amount of math, I
often countered it was more like “Iceland in Space” due to significant cultural similarities.
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that grew between CCP and its player base. It is this unique situation which allowed
CSM6 to press its advantage.
The unique circumstances in Iceland that preceded CSM6’s election in March
2011 have become well known. After an incredible expansion of its banking system,
Iceland’s three largest banks collapsed in late September 2008. According to Lewis,
“The exact dollar amount of Iceland’s financial hole was essentially unknowable, as it
depended on the value of the generally stable Icelandic krona, which had also crashed
and was removed from the market by the Icelandic government.”208 The estimated $100
billion dollars in losses were borne largely by Iceland’s population of 300,000, which
translated into roughly $330,000 for each citizen.209
Analysis of the financial collapse is one that is deeply intertwined with Icelandic
culture and history itself. Until quite recently, much of Iceland’s economy has been
based on its rich fishing industry. However, after a several years of variable fishing
yields, the government privatized their fishing industry. In 1984, the individual
transferable quota was instituted; fishing quotas were allotted to fisherman based on
historical yield.210 While this meant a “serious restriction of freedom,” it created a
system of sustainable wealth that could be traded, borrowed against, or sold.211 As Lewis
describes, “The new wealth transformed Iceland—and turned it from the backwater it had
been for 1,100 years to the place that spawned Björk.”212 This newfound freedom from
traditional occupations of fishing or aluminum smelting allowed Icelanders the ability to
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become highly educated population. However, there was a problem. As Lewis
describes:
Back away from the Icelandic economy and you can’t help but notice
something really strange about it: the people have cultivated themselves to
the point where they are unsuited for the work available to them. All these
exquisitely schooled, sophisticated people, each and every one of whom
feels special, are presented with two mainly horrible ways to earn a living:
trawler fishing and aluminum smelting… At the dawn of the 21st century,
Icelanders were still waiting for some task more suited to their filigreed
minds to turn up inside their economy so they might do it. Enter
investment banking.213
This new period of prosperity was regarded, in part, as Icelanders finally getting
the recognition from the outside world that it had been long due. The period of intense
financial expansion has been referred to as the “New Viking” period because “the dozen
businessmen behind the growth have been likened to the Vikings given their attitude for
conquest.”214 These tales of Iceland’s newfound financial successes became part of the
myth that the insular country told itself:
The old Vikings were not just marauding pirates—they were
modernizers… The New Vikings, Iceland’s advance-guard entrepreneurs,
were also concerned with global influence, intelligence, and profit…[and]
contributed to a new national self-regard.215
This sense of newfound ethnic pride is, in part, what contributed to its downfall.216 An
insular population that has been historically self-reliant, they began educating former
fisherman at the University of Iceland, in essence teaching themselves the art of
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investment from Icelanders that had been educated overseas.217 Icelanders speculated
using their own currency; as one former banker described, “borrow yen at 3 percent, use
them to buy Icelandic kronur, and then invest those kronur at 16 percent.”218 They
“created fake capital by trading assets amongst themselves at inflated values,” described
one hedge-fund manager.219 This was then reinvested in status purchases and businesses
abroad, such as a well-known toy company or London football team.220 Financial advice
that suggested Iceland’s new strategies would prove insolvent went unheeded as it came
from non-Icelanders.
When the bubble burst in late September 2008 and Iceland’s three largest banks—
Landsbankinn, Kaupþing, and Glitnir—were nationalized, unemployment rose from
under 2% to 10% sparking widespread protests in a country not accustomed to political
discontent.221 For CCP, however, it was relatively business as usual; EVE’s reliance on a
global customer base kept CCP immune from much of the economic turbulence seen by
other Icelandic businesses. Described CEO Hilmar Pétursson:
The effects of this manmade financial storm have hit Iceland pretty hard,
but don't worry about us. Icelanders are sturdy and tenacious by nature.
There will still be fun times in Reykjavik regardless. Tough times never
last, tough people do. Iceland is full of tough people, the rest died off
centuries ago. While the world's bank bubble deflates (hopefully in a more
orderly fashion than we have seen so far), we here at CCP focus on our
own economy…we are now quite focused on strengthening the core value
propositions of EVE Online. 222
Insulated from the crisis by the diversity of its customer base, CCP became one of a
handful of businesses still delivering profitable exports. In 2010, CCP received the

217

(Lewis 2009)
Quoted in (Lewis 2009:15)
219
Quoted in (Lewis 2009:8)
220
(Scott 2009; Booth 2012)
221
(Boyes 2009:187)
222
(CCP Hellmar 2008)
218

80
President of Iceland's Export Award for “for remarkable contribution to export trade and
the procurement of foreign currency for the Icelandic Nation.” 223 As The Mittani
suggests, “One could jest that post-crisis Iceland has four export products—fish,
aluminium, Bjork [sic], and internet spaceships—and be alarmingly accurate.”224
Whatever the company rhetoric, the similarity between the behaviors of Iceland’s
financiers and the stewards of CCP is striking. In 2006, CCP acquired White Wolf
Publishing, a financially-struggling company that made tabletop roleplaying games such
as World of Darkness.225 The reaction from the pen-and-paper RPG community was that
of confusion; with no real connection to virtual MMOs, the takeover of a small company
that produced niche tabletop games that were past their prime seemed strange.226 CCP
began developing two additional games: World of Darkness and DUST514. There was
little conceptual overlap between the three games, which would stretch development
resources thin. However due in part to its continued success through the Icelandic
financial crisis, the company was convinced it could achieve “three impossible things at
the same time.”227 Impossible things were, after all, what CCP did best according to their
literature. As one player describes:
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CCP is known for the daring potential of EVE and the travails of trying to
bring that potential into actuality; eyebrows were raised when CCP
proclaimed themselves to be icons of ‘Excellence.’ While expansions
dropped features midstream, CCP proclaimed their ability to ‘Deliver.’228
CCP developers began to tell each other how amazing EVE’s new content would be,
regardless of the fact that it moved farther and farther away from the spaceship combat
that had made EVE a success. When the CSM5 repeatedly said the Incarna expansion,
which was more about avatar development than gameplay, those complaints went
unheeded by the CCP staff.
While one could suggest CCP’s growing isolationism is reflective of every game
company’s faith in their creations, I argue that the particular historical and cultural
circumstances contributed to CCP’s self-admitted hubris.229 For example, the parallels
between the tendency to purchase status items with Iceland’s new wealth and the
“Walking in Stations” content developed for Incarna are striking. Describes Lewis:
…when [Icelanders] lent money they didn’t simply facilitate enterprise but
bankrolled friends and family, so that they might buy and own things, like
real investment bankers: Beverly Hills condos, British soccer teams and
department stores, Danish airlines and media companies, Norwegian
banks, Indian power plants.230
While the real Icelanders purchased homes and cars of increasing value, the newlycreated avatars of New Eden also needed status items. Among the vanity items released
during Incarna was virtual clothing designed by Nicola Formichetti, the fashion director
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of Lady Gaga.231 Likening designer virtual pants to real world clothing that might retail
for $1000, CCP Senior Producer Arnar Hrafn Gylfason asked the players:
Why would you want to wear a pair of $1,000 jeans when you can get
perfectly similar jeans for under $50? What do other people think about
you when they see you wearing them? For some you will look like the sad
culmination of vainness while others will admire you and think you are the
coolest thing since sliced bread.232
The case could be made that the sense of cool that Gylfason referred to was Icelanders’
new identity as “the essence of Cool, a successful nation where people couldn’t stop
partying,” rather than something reflective of EVE culture at all.233
When the reaction of the player base to the Incarna content and the leaked
microtransactions documents proved to be as incendiary as CSM5 had warned, the
newly-elected CSM6 was flown to Iceland for an emergency summit with CCP
developers. After days of negotiations, CCP and the CSM6 reached an accord.
Described as a “wall of unity” that was cemented around the singular opinion that CCP
was off course, and CCP vowed to listen to the player base.234 Describes one player, the
CSM:
…stepped up and became the voice of the protests. It was prepared to bite
the hand that created it even as CCP was flying the council out for an
emergency summit….It appeared that CSM6 emergency summit was an
instrumental part of the effort to talk CCP off the ledge, though there was
still a gap between CCP and the CSM… And the Council of Stellar
Management came out of it looking like a major force in the game.235
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The community’s awareness and perception of the CSM had grown, and their ability to
deliver results on behalf of the player base assuaged many earlier doubts of the CSM’s
legitimacy.
However, there was significant time between the emergency summit and the
release of the next expansion, Crucible, in November 2011. While some of the delay can
be explained by lead time necessary to for game development to change course, more
was needed to persuade CCP to change their ways. After every summit, CCP and the
CSM release minutes of the discussions that take place to the community; generally, this
is simply a matter of course. However, CCP developers continued to tell each other how
amazing their content was as outsider, non-Icelandic input did not carry the same
weight.236 When reviewing the minutes, CCP staff tried to insert some of their marketing
words into the minutes. At this point, CCP desperately needed the buy in of the player
base, and the CSM’s word that CCP could “Deliver” “Excellence” would do much to turn
public opinion back into their favor.
The solution was simple, and the CSM refused to sign off on the altered minutes.
Described one informant:
After that as pressure mounted on [CCP] from the relatively small number
of people who were interested in minutes—because minutes are such a
relatively trivial thing overall—but after certain time it stops becoming
something that a tiny interested demographic…cares about and starts to
become a news story.
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One CSM representative described interacting with a particular development team that had no real desire to interact
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84
As the CSM is under standard non-disclosure agreements, the only thing that CSM
representatives could say is that they were “very unhappy with how CCP is behaving.”
As the members of CSM6 had access to a wide variety of media contacts, and the denial
of interviews with the gaming media becomes a source of serious contention within the
community.237 As CCP Xhagen describes, “These things might sound trivial and many
people might call it a battle of semantics, but the content of these minutes are far from
trivial.”238 By the time the mounting pressure delivers the minutes much later than
desired, there is again widespread discontent among the players. Describes the CSM1
Chairman Jade Constantine:
I have trouble believing there was any significant controversy whatsoever
over the content there…The entire thing reads like CSM saying the player
base is unhappy about X, Y, Z and CCP saying “oh well its [sic] our
strategy to press on regardless and ignore you”. It is disappointing that the
emergency summit appears so meaningless in retrospect and I guess it
does explain why no real changes have been declared 4 months after
incarna-release...I stood there at Thingvellir listening to this company
describing us as “internet chieftains” responsible for a grand new
experiment in virtual politics as stakeholders in the virtual world of New
Eden and I thought “this is pretty loopy, but its good loopy, its visionary
madness, its [sic] exciting and its bold.” But what I read in these
emergency minutes is not anything approaching a partnership of respect its
[sic] simply a cash-greedy corporate buzzword addiction riding roughshod
over the opinions of the Eve player base and deciding to ignore all
feedback, council, advise [sic] and suggestion from the CSM
representatives.239
CCP’s attempt to alter the emergency summit to something more favorable to their
current development path proved to be the final straw for many players. The move was
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seen as yet another example of how CCP was simply going to do whatever they thought
was “awesome” regardless of what the player base desired in their virtual world.
Barely three weeks after the release of the minutes, CCP lost approximately 8% of
its account volume as players unsubscribed, or “unsubbed” in masse.240 Unsubbing, or
cancelling a player’s paid subscription to a game, is generally seen as an empty threat;
time invested in building characters, communities, and worlds can generally not be taken
with players should they choose to move to a different game. However after months of
being misled about the direction of the company, many players had simply had enough.
The drop in account subscriptions and mounting media pressure was enough to finally
persuade CCP to change; CEO Hilmar Pétursson released a letter of apology to the EVE
community, stating that “I was impatient when I should have been cautious, defiant when
I should have been conciliatory and arrogant when I should have been humble.”241
Admitting his fault in steering EVE awry, he pledged a refocus on EVE’s core spaceship
content. As part of this refocus back to “Flying in Space,” and the drop in account
subscriptions, 20% of CCP’s worldwide staff was laid off.242

Discussion
While the players got what they wanted and the CSM looked like a “major force
in the game,” the CSM’s ability to leverage power as an institution is still an open
question for many in the community.243 The CSM undoubtedly played a very important
role in advocating for change from the point of view of the players. Both CSM5 and
CSM6 can point to repeated attempts to advise CCP against making content that would
240
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not appeal to their core, subscribing player base. CSM6 were portrayed as strong
negotiators after the emergency summit that followed the Incarna debacle. After the
controversial attempt at white-washing the emergency summit minutes, players received
an apology from the CEO, corporate refocusing on EVE’s core content, and an expansion
that catered to CSM demands.
However, as several informants were quick to point out, it was not the pressure of
the CSM that caused CCP to change its course. It was the media that spread awareness of
the growing disconnect between CCP and its player base, which in turn caused a drop in
subscriber sales. Described one informant:
CCP only pays attention to the media. CCP had ignored the CSM when it
came to pressure for years, as was obvious. CSM5 had issued an open
letter about Incarna [stating their disagreements with CCP], and precisely
who gave a fuck. The big difference was in CSM6…They used these
media contacts…to be able to focus a spotlight from the press on to CCP.
The press loves a good company fucks up story, especially in the MMO
environment. I think if CCP had not come under pressure, if there had not
been sort of a media angle, and if there had not been people actively
working to act out against what they were doing in Incarna and the
monocle situation, then I think there would have been much less impetus
to change within CCP.
Other CSMs have certainly interacted with the media. The CSM was created to placate
the T20 scandal, which had tremendous media coverage. The CSM itself is unusual
within MMOs, and that uniqueness leads to occasionally making the industry news.
Even CSM5 had released an open statement letter about the state of Incarna, criticizing
the lack of communication with the CSM and the apparent lack of planning of the
expansion.244 In a sense, the CSM has grown and evolved as a concept within the eye of
the gaming media.
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The difference between CSM6 and other CSMs was its willingness to use public
discourse to leverage financial pressure against CCP. This leverage in turn broke through
cultural barriers that had been a significant barrier to making in-game change. As the
CSM has no hard power, the power comes from solely from the CSM’s ability to
influence the decision-makers at CCP. Many of the players mentioned the Icelandic
temperament as a barrier to being heard by the CCP staff; this thus inhibited their ability
to lobby on behalf of the player base. Insular and often skeptical of outsiders, one
informant described it as “Icelandic group think” that reinforced the decisions and
opinions of those within CCP. “They really do have a Viking sense of just charge
forward and smash all impossible barriers,” described another source, suggesting that the
approach to change and specifically how the opposition of the player base was seen from
the Icelandic point of view. Historically, most of the CCP management staff has been
Icelandic. This changed somewhat during restructuring after Incarna; handovers in key
positions to non-Icelanders opened up the ability for dialogue in some areas.245
To break through the traditionally insular Icelandic thinking of the developers that
resisted outside opinion, the CSM turned to the media. “We just cut them out of the
process entirely,” described one informant. “We shaped our own message—i.e. we went
to the press. We did things independently, and that meant that they had to play along.”
The ability of CSM6 to recruit the media and shape the dialogue is characteristic of how
propaganda plays out within EVE politics itself. This CSM was comprised of influential
members of strong alliances, several of whom had developed contacts with the industry
media through regular game play. Setting the tone and shape of public discourse of the
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player base is routinely practiced by alliances within EVE, and industry media proved to
be similar. As seen with threadnoughts, those that set the initial tone of public
discussions gets to frame the narrative in whatever way they wish; in circumventing CCP,
the CSM got the ability to shape the tone, form, and content of the aftermath of Incarna.
The CSM’s singular interpretation of events is then redistributed by the media to the
industry and the player base.
This largely negative media coverage offered leverage that earlier CSMs did not
have. Part of the newfound leverage was not only the deliberate focusing of the media,
but the circumstances in which that attention was leveraged. As one of the few
companies that were left operating after the Icelandic financial crisis, negative coverage
was a powerful motivator. Iceland’s economy had just begun to show signs of recovery
in 2011 when the Incarna protests took place, and a drop in confidence in CCP’s products
would incur a drop in an income stream that CCP—with its two games in development
outside of EVE Online—and Iceland itself sorely needed. 246 As part of the refocusing,
many of the staff that were let go were outside of Iceland; for example, content
development staff in Atlanta that was offered a choice to accept severance or move to
Iceland.247
In these ways, CSM6 found new weapons of influence to use against CCP to
affect desired changes. EVE’s most effective leaders bring all available tools to a
conflict, as well as the willingness to use them. Within the circumstances that surrounded
Incarna, the determination to use all of the CSM’s available means including the media
and the large alliances to which they were connected led to far greater results than had
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any previous CSM. While the success of these strategies were in part connected with the
broader economic climate in Iceland, success is also determined by EVE’s cultural
mentality to assess weakness, apply the appropriate pressure, and do what is necessary to
deliver results. While some informants suggested to me that the CSM has no power at
all—the power to enact change came from external influences such as the media—I
would argue that its true strength comes from the culture in which the council is
embedded. By allowing the CSM to operate “as Eve-ish[ly] as possible,” as one
developer would describe, this enables cultural norms that pull no punches in the road to
achieving power.
These methods of influence are culturally constructed through EVE’s political
gameplay, and provide a means of working around the limitations of the CSM model.
While these methods have not been universally adopted, the broader effect is that it
demonstrated the possibility of the CSM to exert real change. This, in conjunction with
other factors, is part of the new receptivity of CCP to the CSM. While some CSM7
members described the difficulty of living in the shadow of CSM6, the access created by
the focus on the stakeholder status provides numerous opportunities for influence in the
manner of CSM6 should the situation require it. “CCP guarantees and provides all
council members an audience,” describes Has Jagerblitzen. “Its [sic] up to us and our
individual skill to make the most of that opportunity to influence and affect [sic] real
change.”248
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Chapter IV: Authority and Legitimacy
Introduction
“[CCP has] been talking about this stakeholder thing since CSM4. What is this?
What is it to you? What part do we play in it?” asked Seleene, the Chairman of CSM7.249
The CSM was hosting one of its semi-regular town hall meetings. Town halls are one of
the ways that CSM representatives gain feedback from the player base and answer
questions about the direction CCP is taking on different features. Hosted on EVE
University’s Mumble server and broadcast live over EVE Radio, the audio quality
occasionally became distorted due to a large number of players listening on the server.
Players asked the CSM questions on the issues of the day over voice chat or over a
specially-created chat channel in game. It was also Super Bowl Sunday in the United
States, and the sports-related background noise could be occasionally heard behind the
discussion of some American players.
CSM7’s work has been driven by the need for procedure and focused on
codifying the CSM’s feedback into CCP’s internal structures. Perhaps this is
unsurprising considering that the Chairman is a former CCP developer who understands
CCP’s particular needs through this framework, and this shapes CSM7’s approach to its
work.250 This has mainly revolved around developing the CSM’s stakeholder status, a
role that was granted to the CSM at the end of CSM4. Within CCP’s development
methodology, stakeholders are consulted to help shape the course of product
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development. “That’s what our focus has been this year is holding accountable for not
just using stakeholder as a pretty name,” suggests Hans Jagerblitzen, “but actually using
us the way that they use the product owners, the marketing team, the individual
developers, and actually the people that are part of their own internal stakeholder
meetings.”251 This experiment in codifying the stakeholder status was a way for the CSM
to “prove that we were a worthwhile contributor and that we could do this without
slowing them down.”252
The town hall was filled with specific questions about the direction CCP is taking
with particular game features, and the delegates talked around their non-disclosure
agreements as best they can. They talked less like regular game players and much more
like company representatives, though I have been repeatedly told the CSM is not like
being a junior game designer. “CCP seems to have adapted the AGILE methods pretty
well to the release cycle,” suggested Issler Dainze. “Somebody that wants to be in the
CSM would really be well-served if they really had some familiarity with software
engineering and experienced working in an AGILE environment.”253 CCP uses a holistic
and adaptive method of development that involves cooperative teamwork to develop an
idea. This is known as the scrum development method. CCP has adapted this process
with elements from the AGILE, which is another flexible and adaptable method of
software development.254 “We call it ‘scrum, but,” described CCP Unifex, Executive
Producer of EVE Online. “When you end up saying ‘Oh, well it is kind of like scrum
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what we are doing, but,’ and you kind of make all these excuses. We try to get away from
that and move ourselves to a better sort of scrum-agile combo way of doing things.”255
In many other games, this type of technical talk would likely feel out of place. In
EVE, however, there is an active conversation in the Mumble chat room about player’s
least favorite software development method, the waterfall method; this was CCP’s old
approach to EVE’s development, which was based around linear, sequential, and less
flexible model.256 “The thing about AGILE is that there really is not a lot of time to stop
and think and plan…” continued Dainze. “Being on the CSM now there really isn’t a sit
back for three months and talk to CCP again. You are engaged real time, because they
are thinking real time and they are developing real time.”
CSM7’s talks have been filled with a focus on building these processes. Their
meeting minutes have been extensive, with more than a hundred pages of transcripts and
descriptions of the on-goings of the summits with developers. Much work has been done
to build these processes where no clear guidelines existed before, and CSM7 seems to
have come a long way in laying that groundwork with CCP. “It remains to be seen if this
new planning process actually produces a better set of EVE futures,” describes Dainze.
“We will have to hope for the best and see what these new expansions look like as a
result of this change. But yes, I think CCP is paying a lot more attention to the CSM and
letting us work a lot more closely with them.”

The transition from CSM6 to CSM7 is a dramatic shift in methods, and not
everyone is pleased with the new direction. “Releasing like 100 pages of completely
trivial bullshit for minutes was just drowning people in excess information,” described
255
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one informant. Although no politician can please everyone, it illustrates the disconnect
between what the community considers legitimate authority and what is not. As one
informant would suggest, other than a small demographic, players “do not care about
transparency; all they are about are results.” And while functioning processes may lead
to more tangible outcomes down the line, results and accomplishments tend to be
concrete within EVE culture.
The change in the relationship with CCP is somewhat analogous to a shift
between different types of authority. Despite the lack of hard power to enforce the
changes they desired upon CCP, CSM6 developed powerful methods of influencing CCP
developers. CSM6’s actions and negotiation with CCP during the Incarna debacle were
legitimized by the community, in part by tapping into the same strong community
supports that got the representatives elected in the first place. Filled with influential
personalities, CSM6 could typify Weber’s charismatic authority; CSM6 was not seen as a
legitimate entity because convention demanded it—indeed the CSM was still seen by
many as a public relations tool until that point— but because the community believed in
the picture of society they represented.257 This picture is one that is shaped by the
experiences within a 0.0 alliance, which is the type of gameplay that many players felt
was most threatened by the changes in Incarna. And it is ability to run the CSM like an
EVE alliance that let them successfully navigate the Incarna crisis and come out looking
like “a major force in the game.”258
The transition from CSM6 to CSM7 in part mirrored the changed state within
CCP. “What happens on the CSM in terms of activity out in public tends to be a
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reflection on how things are going with CCP at the time,” describes Seleene, Chairman of
CSM7. “CSM6 was a reflection of what was going on at the time. [CCP] could not tell
left from right … They could not put out a single [developer] blog without stepping on
themselves. It was just atrocious.” 259 The more confrontational tone of CSM6 was
needed for the circumstances that surrounded Incarna, and “that approach worked for
what was going on at the time.”260 These lent themselves well to the leadership strategies
of EVE’s major alliances. “We decided from day one…We are going to run this like we
run things in the game,” describes Seleene, “and the results speak for themselves.”
The more cooperative focus of CSM7 was in part due to the change in receptivity
of CCP after CSM6. Describes Seleene, CSM7 tried to:
…get the CSM into a position where we were not necessarily the rabblerousers, but we were seen as a more of a partnership in pushing the game
forward. Some people seem to have the opinion that the CSM’s job is
specifically to raise hell whenever things aren’t happening. Well, things
were happening fairly well over the past year, so there wasn’t a lot of
rabble to be raised. So we spent the majority of the time trying to make
progress.261
The fact that there was “rabble to be raised” allowed CSM7 to work on formalizing the
rules that could and should rightly govern the relationship between CCP and the CSM.
This could also roughly parallel Weber’s concept of traditional authority; as there was no
reason to manage crisis mode with the more authoritarian tactics used by large alliances,
this allowed the deeper, more cooperative relationships such as the stakeholder status to
take hold. This incorporates methods of influence into the development process.
The key difference in this shift in authority is that traditional authority is generally
seen as codifying those relationships that maintain the power and world vision that was
259
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posed by charismatic leaders. The CSM as a coalition of major alliance leaders makes
the concept useful and relevant for players who see the CSM as a way to navigate the attimes unstable relationship between CCP and the player base. However, that same
political authority is lessened for the community when the relationship settles into more
“peacetime” processes. While these processes legitimate the authority of the CSM for
both the CSM and for CCP, the community skepticism of a “peacetime” CSM is bound
by the cultural ideas of democracy and process that confer a stronger sense of legitimacy
in times of crisis than without it.

Democracy and War within EVE
“Quick question, Jessica, and don’t take this the wrong way, but I am curious.
You do realize what EVE Online is in terms of community, right?”
As a standard part of the interview process, I shared with my sources an informed
consent agreement. Informed consent is used, in part, to understand the risks that one
could face a result of participating in an academic study. While many types of harm that
could come to a subject do not apply within virtual worlds, confidentiality is always a
concern. EVE thrives on secrecy. Outsiders are not to be trusted. Asking too many
questions brands you a spy, which can have many negative consequences such as being
removed from a corporation, bounties placed on one’s head, etc. For my purposes,
asking for information violates some measure of these social norms, which are have
developed as a defense against the threat of espionage in a society that is in a constant
state of war. Therefore, confidentiality is often very important in these situations; while
no physical harm would likely happen, a carelessly-spoken about another corporation
could easily lead to an incident between alliances. Material harm—such as ships or
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territory—or loss of prestige are possible losses that could occur. But then again, as EVE
players come willingly into a player-versus-player game environment, it might be a lot of
fun too.
I laughed, and I assured my informant that I do.
“It’s kind of amusing. You are making all these qualifiers about how you’re not
going to be a horrible person or anything else like that. You know this community prides
itself on such things,” he laughed. “This will be rather pleasant then, compared to the
other interviews I do.”
“I have only been playing the game for four months now,” I answered. “I don’t
have any way to prove that I am not a spy except to point to my university. [Through the
institutional review board process], they have vetted that I am somewhat more ethical
than a Nazi and I have no agenda.” I had explained that ethics reviews like the
institutional review board, or IRB, have their historical roots in the aftermath of the
Nuremburg Trials. Normally, a player could point to their corporate history—a list of
corporations that a character has belonged to since its creation—that is attached to their
profile to vouch for my integrity. As a new player, my corporate history is dismally
short, another indicator that a person may not be who they claim to be. As the EVE
saying goes, “In rust we trust,” and trust is earned over time, just as a ship accumulates
rust the more battle it sees.262 Instead, my informed consent form stands in as a kind of
real-world corporate history.
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He laughed. “I have to write some of this shit down.” The tone of the
conversation immediately shifted to something more informal and casual. While the
CSM members are accustomed to dealing with the public and the media, it has a tendency
to get caught up in EVE’s larger political narratives. Summit minutes and community
posts are carefully crafted—both by the CSM and CCP—to present a certain image. For
a community whose interactions are couched in alliance propaganda, CSM
communications are often treated in a similar way. All releases to the public are
reviewed by CCP as part of the CSM’s non-disclosure agreement to prevent information
about in-development features from leaking to the community before CCP is ready.
CSM messages are parsed for both what did and did not say by the player base, who still
treats CCP with a heavy amount of skepticism after the T20 incident. The community
initially cast the CSM with an oversight role to keep CCP from taking advantage of the
player base’s trust again; a cooperative relationship, such as the one CSM7 sought to
build, is treated with a similar amount of skepticism.
As a game, EVE’s virtual society exists in a constant state of war. Corporations
struggle for power over scarce resources. While war can be profitable, it is also seen by
most players as a tremendous amount of fun. Many of the social norms that govern EVE
player’s conduct are a consequence of the actions that a corporation must take to maintain
itself during wartime. As the primary mode of social organization within the EVE itself,
corporations and alliances help to orient player understanding as they move through the
game world. This includes what constitutes effective leadership to navigate constantly
troubled times.
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“Democracy is death,” described one player. “In a situation where you need to be
able to respond quickly and with force to strategic problems, invasions or what have you,
you can’t wait for a vote.”263 The inefficiency and vulnerability of the democratic system
comes in both the time it takes to make decisions as well as the amount of people
necessary to make those decisions. The more people that participate in the administration
of your corporation, the more vulnerable you become to both internal and external
threats. Information can be leaked to enemy corporations and destroyed from the outside,
or it can be corrupted from internal spies that might sway corporations to make unwise
decisions. Described one player:
Dictatorship is pretty much the most effective way to run an EVE alliance
or corporation… When you have to wait for the council to get online,
then discuss the issue, then vote on the issue, then revote on the issue
because someone dropped cheese on the table, it just takes too long… In
any persistent, virtual world, democracy rarely if ever works. Decisions
simply cannot be made in time for when they actually matter.264
As these threats are part of everyday gameplay within EVE, the ability for a
corporation to have and project a united front through propaganda has become an
important defense against such weaknesses. “Usually speaking, what you see publically
or what you hear publically is a lie,” describes The Mittani.265 The skillful control and
manipulation of the public narrative—both within your own corporation and on the
public forums—has become an important mechanic in EVE’s gameplay. While such
countermeasures are not rendered unnecessary by authoritarian control, it serves to
highlight some of the culturally perceived weaknesses to widespread public discussions
that are necessary to the CSM’s model of deliberative democracy.
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In addition to tighter controls over the function and security of corporations and
alliances, dictatorships are regarded as providing better game play. Many EVE players
regard themselves as simply that: players, as opposed to virtual citizens. “Why would
you want to join a dictatorial corporation where pretty much whatever you say is ignored
or you think it is ignored?” asks one player.266 “Most people in EVE just want to have
fun. They are playing a game and they want to have fun… They will gladly join an
organization where they don’t have any power because that means they have more to
fight and less paperwork.”
Some of the players I talked to felt similarly, and were happy to give up a voice in
corporate decision-making in exchange for the ability to simply show up and fight in a
conflict. One player I talked to likened it to being a “cog in the machine,” and was happy
to have a low-effort outlet for fun whenever he logged in. “I would rather keep it simple
and easy to leave and come back when I need to.”
While the casual dismissal of citizen rights might be objectionable in a real world
context, EVE’s status as a game changes that perception for its players. Democratic
rights become characterized as work, and a barrier to fun. This is particularly important
in the context of EVE’s status as a sandbox universe, where individual agency is required
to drive game play. In a universe that offers unrestricted player freedom, the tendency to
immediately surrender those freedoms to those that would dictate player action might be
concerning to some readers. As one developer would tell me:
EVE does not offer any goals to reach. You have to set the goals for
yourself in the context of the community. EVE does not offer you any
moral guidelines. You are allowed to do what you can… It is difficult for
people to understand this lack of morality.
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For players that are used to traditional MMOs that offer a determinative path through
content, EVE’s completely open universe can be overwhelming. A corporation with a
strong authoritarian framework can provide ideological structure that can help orient
player behavior in an otherwise indeterminate environment. You need a “dream you can
sell to people,” suggests one player:
You basically have to find a reason to make people come and join your
little corps…The joy of EVE Online is that it is an open sandbox setting,
and you can pretty much say this is what we stand for. These are our
ideals. This is what we’re against.267
Those corporations that offer a strong ideology can offer predictable opportunities based
on that ideology; for instance, a mining corps would tend to favor higher security areas of
space, lower stress asteroid mining, and focus on market competition. A pirate
corporation, on the other hand, would encourage scamming, small group or solo fights
against other players, or gate camping in lower security space.268 In each, the ideology
of the corporation determines the type of experience a player can expect. Rather than a
loss of personal rights, EVE players see it as an investment in fun: “If you don’t trust
your leaders that he can provide you your fun, then why would you stay with that
leader?”269 Strong, unified ideology provides the clear goals for player action the
sandbox game does not provide, and can prove a powerful means of organizing players
for larger action. For those that view EVE as a game, this leads to opportunities for more
fun.
From this perspective, democracy does not provide clear outcomes. A
corporation’s objectives and strategies based on the makeup of players offering input.
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This instills a measure of uncertainty to what is expected and the direction a corporation
will go. This becomes a hindrance to a player trying to decide what type of corporation
to join.
While contingent actions happen within EVE—the most carefully laid plans may
go awry or become unfeasible during large scale combat maneuvers—dictatorships
provide clear direction without deliberation and ideology can shape that behavior in the
absence of present leadership. According to one informant, a democratic corporation
might be “strong, but not that agile.” The capacity for unified action is an asset when
things go awry, rather than responsiveness that is traditionally associated with
democracy. A dictatorship’s responsiveness to changing circumstances through action is
seen as an asset over a democracy’s slow accommodation of many player viewpoints.
Considering these views on democratic processes, we can begin to understand the
cultural expectations EVE players have for leadership within the community: decisive,
unified, timely action that is focused on outcomes. Those outcomes are structured to
provide the maximum fun for the most players, and “fun” is defined by the strong
ideological concepts that underpin that leadership style.
This type leadership is valued in the community, the widespread skepticism of the
Council of Stellar Management can be understood within its own context. Elected to
represent the needs of the player base to CCP, the CSM was originally seen as a space
parliament. This would further extend the principles of deliberative democracy that
underpin its structure. The time needed to sort through community opinion is significant,
and while the focus is on a unified set of recommendations to CCP, arriving at those
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recommendations takes time. These types of processes are exactly those which, for EVE
players, characterize weakness and vulnerability.
When asked about the possible disconnect between EVE’s skepticism of
democracy and the ideas behind the CSM, developers told me that they now work
together much better than expected. The idea was to let the democracy be as “as Eve-ish
as possible.” In the real world, people make the mistake of thinking that “democracy is
this ultimate social utopia where everything is nice and good and works as flawlessly as
possible. That is just not the reality and will never be.” The decision to let EVE players
act like EVE players would have important consequences for later CSMs.
With few examples of player elected governments to follow, the CSM had to
develop their own operational mechanisms. The only formal goal was to set the agenda
for the summit in Iceland; otherwise “CCP [had] set no expectations” for the work the
CSM was to do.270 The CSM had to develop its own guidelines for CSM officers, their
job duties, future CSM appointments, voting on user-submitted petitions, etc. The chat
logs of the first CSM meetings are filled with discussions of process. Described one
informant, at first the CSM was a “completely useless parliamentarian talking shop where
people are squabbling over procedure.” From an institutional perspective, identifying
procedure is important foundational work. However when the community is used to
decisions being made quickly and decisively, the CSM’s work moves very slow by
comparison.
Compounding the issue was the fact that the CSM had no official power to
command CCP to listen to player suggestions. According to CEO Hilmar Pétursson, in
the beginning, their biggest power was setting the agenda for the summit in Iceland. “But
270
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as the whole concept moves on—and if they are able to bring to us matters which are
truly representative of players’ concerns—then their influence will grow over time.”271
When the CSM presented issues to CCP developers, they could not compel developers to
implement the changes. Even when community proposals were passed internally by the
CSM, those changes would have to “wait 18 months to even begin being worked on,”
according to one informant. While this is understandable given the lead time necessary
to make large scale changes in a video game with a large production staff, it lead to a
huge backlog of CSM-submitted issues. At one point the CSM “had actually submitted
over 150 issues, of which maybe 10 had been dealt with,” described another informant.
“The community were [sic] less than impressed.”
In a community that values speed of decision-making and decisive leadership that
leads to concrete outcomes, the frustration with the CSM’s lack of measurable results is
understandable. While the CSMs did manage to pass some small, easily implemented
fixes, these “Small Things” type changes were not enough to cultivate a sense of
legitimacy among the EVE community. By CSM4, voter turnout had fallen to 7.36% of
eligible voters.272 At this point, it is easy to see how the CSM could be seen as only a
“cynical PR stunt by CCP to paper over the damage caused by the infamous T20
incident.”273 It is also easy to see how the CSM had been “written off by the vast
majority of the player base as being irrelevant,” as one informant described.
Public perception of the CSM began to change some structural changes during
CSM4. Among the important changes was the change in term length from six months to
one year. According to one player, “six months is just too short of a time to learn how
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the fuck CCP works and gets anything done.”274 The entire six months was spent getting
acclimated to how CCP functioned at the design level, and then a new council would be
elected. In addition, the lead time on CSM suggestions was much greater than six
months; a given CSM would be well out of office by the time their suggestions might be
implemented. The shift to a term of one year allowed CSMs to understand CCP’s
function as a business and develop long-term working relationships with CCP
development staff. As the CSM does not have power to enforce changes, these
relationships become crucial to persuading developers that the CSM’s suggestions are
wanted by the community. It also led to stronger community relationships, as players had
time to be invested in their candidate. “If you artificially limit [community participation]
with term limits then interest and the validity of the system goes down.”275

Peacekeeping and the Stakeholder Status
In commenting on the CSM8 election, one community blogger describes the
effectiveness of a CSM:
The judge of how well a CSM does is related to three things.
1) How well they expressed community concerns and ideas to CCP
2) How well they increased the profile of the CSM to the EvE populous
3) How much they have increased the power of the CSM within CCP
They are our voice, CSM 6, while I dislike the Mittani [sic], he did a great
job of all of the above. CSM 7 has pretty much failed in all of these as
while they are working closer with the developers they have already stated
that CCP ignored 50% of what they actually wanted.
In essence the CSM is our union, well our union just got taken over by the
employers.276
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Similar discussions can be found across EVE’s forums and network of blogs as CSM7’s
term comes to an end and the EVE community prepares for the next election. Much of
the talk of ineffectiveness revolves around the lack of immediate outcomes that can be
held up to the community.
The current climate of CSM7 has been a “peacetime CSM,” and many of the
culturally appropriate ways of leading might be less immediately applicable, the
influence recruited by CSM6 has been used to building working relationships with CCP.
According to one informant, “CSM7 is much more interested in trying to prevent a
similar crisis than be lauded for dealing with one.” This focus on process-oriented
signals inefficiency for much of the community, and at “25% into the term and already
we’re being called a failed CSM because of lack of accomplishment,” as one informant
described.
Central to the focus on forging relationships is the push for stakeholder status.
From a product development standpoint, CCP utilizes the scrum method of software
development. Scrum is a holistic and adaptive method of development that involves
cooperative teamwork to develop an idea.277 In scrum, development work is organized
into fixed time intervals called sprints. Each sprint team is assigned a given software
development task, comprised of a number of work items called a backlog. The focus is
on quality of software over quantity; the short, concentrated focus of sprint teams helps to
keep development on schedule.278

277
278

(Takeuchi & Nonaka 1986)
(Beedle et al. 1999)

106
Within the scrum system, stakeholders “enable the project and are the people for
whom the project produces agreed-upon benefit(s).”279 “What [the stakeholder status] is
really zeroing in on is that it is part of this specific software development process,”
suggested one player.280 By labeling the CSM as a stakeholder, CCP was officially
recognizing the expertise the CSM had been offering from a product-development
standpoint. This allows the targeted feedback from the player base to be built into their
development practices. While poorly defined at first, the stakeholder status became a
“big feature in their marketing fluff,” according to one informant. It became a way for
CCP to tell the community that their feedback would be officially considered and
codified, though at the outset neither party knew how it would play out in practice.
For EVE players, legitimate authority is cultivated in part by productive action;
those that can deliver on their promises are seen as best qualified to speak on behalf of
the player base. This creates two different routes to political legitimacy. Does a CSM
produce better results when it focuses on creating strong ties with CCP developers, and
increasing legitimacy within the company framework? Or does a CSM produce better
results when political legitimacy has already been established through the actions of
community leaders, which then are elected to the CSM?
Both strategies were employed since CSM5, when the structural changes allowed
deeper and more meaningful work relationships with CCP. Cultivating a sense of
legitimacy within CCP meant codifying and operationalizing stakeholder status.
Embedded relationships translated into explicit procedures for translating the CSM’s
work into actionable items. Gaining an elected seat based on existing community
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relationships led players to treat the CSM much more like an authoritarian EVE alliance,
rather than a business relationship. Relationships with CCP developers were more
informal and less open to public scrutiny. Different cultural practices arose around the
changing nature of the CSM-CCP relationship that conferred very different senses of
legitimacy within the community.
This is not to suggest that both types of legitimacy are not important. As one
CCP director would describe: “Saying you're accountable to the players is a pretty narrow
view– You need to be accountable to the people who work here, and you have a
responsibility to be professional.”281 Being taken as a legitimate institution by both the
players and CCP are clearly important; however, both strategies are shaped by EVE’s
cultural logic in different ways.
Beginning with CSM5 and continuing in CSM7, these CSMs worked to shape
processes that would help define the work of the CSM. As the T20 incident became
more distant, the focus for the CSM became less about oversight and more a “movement
within the community to see if this tool CCP had provided to them could actually
accomplish anything.” According to one informant:
The first few CSMs didn’t really understand what it was they were
supposed to do. CCP didn’t really know what to do with them… But as
time went on it evolved into something that had the potential to be a bit
more collaborative and to where the CSM could actually be a proper
middle man or liaison between the company and the player base at large.
The implementation of stakeholder status provided the impetus to define and codify these
relationships. At the outset of CSM5, this meant that the CSM would be allowed to
submit development lists for consideration in the planning cycle, and have those lists
represented by an advocate during release planning. The CSM worked closely with the
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community to prioritize items that were of most importance to the player base. One
developer would liken the CSM to an “idea filter that helps get rid of some of the white
noise” in terms of player feedback. The CSM worked to codify these processes into
actionable language that the developers at CCP would respond to.
The stakeholder relationship is being further codified within CSM7. As part of an
experiment, the CSM has been assigned to a specific team to develop a feature for future
release. While these collaborative efforts are still being refined, the first “test run at that
resulted in the bounty-hunting feature.”282 While mistakes were admittedly made on both
sides, this allows the developers more targeted, in-depth feedback on one particular area
of the game. It also allows the CSM to better understand the constraints of the scrum
system, as well as experimenting with how stronger, more formalized relationships might
work.
As part of acknowledging the way the CSM was now embedded within the
corporate culture of CCP, CSM5 consciously adopted a “culture of inclusiveness and
professional standards of behavior” that would be expected of any stakeholder at the
corporate level.283 This was to consciously improve the perception of the CSM within
the development teams; as “CCP [developers] have no obligation to interact with the
CSM,” maintaining a professional demeanor during communications was of paramount
importance.284 While there were many reasons for the institutional pushback, the level of
transparency in communication and activities from CSM5 served as a way to prove to the
community they were working on their behalf.285 The transparency served to illustrate
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for the community that work was in progress even when development times meant that
actual results had yet to come. And while this did not satisfy the entire player base, it
served as an attempt to justify the workings of the CSM for the community.
However, this also served to attach names to particular projects so that they could
be held accountable by the community. When players have the tendency to analyze
every aspect of the game, negative feedback can be directed at the developers who are
directly associated with certain areas of the game. “As soon as a dev blog comes out,
even though he or she is representing an entire team, the name gets flamed if the contents
are not liked,” one informant described. This level of accountability made developers
nervous, due to the intensity of community feedback. This hesitancy increased distance
between developers and CSM5, serving to undercut the legitimacy of these working
relationships.
With ideas about perceived vulnerabilities within organizations that offer
complete transparency and accountability, we can understand why players might act this
way. Any organization that makes its inner-most workings public leaves itself open to
the possibility of attack. Everything is interpreted within this culture of conflict, and the
more formalized procedures that developers use is no exception. For players, this leaves
the possibility to scrutinize perceived weaknesses within game mechanics, and leave
feedback targeted at the particular developers responsible. While EVE players may
routinely engage in this sort of forum metagaming, developers can be uncomfortable with
that amount of scrutiny.
In CSM6, a reduction of community transparency also helped to foster stronger
relationships with company developers. Informal methods of communication helped to
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strengthen the relationships between individuals on the CSM and CCP, rather than
merely facilitating communication between functioning entities in the development
process. Shielding developers from public scrutiny made them more willing to consider
implementing new changes. According to one source, summit meetings in Iceland are
“recorded so everybody from the CCP site has to be sort of aware that potentially they
could say something that their bosses might disapprove of.” A more guarded approach to
the CSM’s communications keeps them away from the ire of the community, as well as
possible retaliation from their bosses at CCP. From EVE’s cultural perspective, shielding
these communications and processes from public scrutiny allows for fewer exposed
vulnerabilities. Whatever weakness might exist are not admitted or are explained away
through carefully crafted ideological messages, which allows the real work between the
CSM and CCP to get accomplished without consequences.

Conclusion
The stakeholder concept is still evolving and outcomes of these collaborative
efforts are unclear. CSM7 has been noted for its movement back toward being open with
the community, releasing detailed minutes and summit notes. However, these reveal the
very deep working relationships that have been built as part of the stakeholder process.
The new focus does not please everyone; the wealth of information serves to illustrate
just how embedded in the design process the CSM is becoming. For those that still
believe it is the CSM’s job to police CCP, these new peace-time relationships are very
uncomfortable, especially where there are few concrete results that can be immediately
pointed to for the community. Many of the results of CSM7’s new cooperative approach
will be apparent in the coming expansions, which does not altogether satisfy a
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community that is used to immediate results. This perhaps doubly more apparent when
held up next to the previous CSM6, which routinely communicated loudly and clearly
what it had accomplished to the player base and the media.
I would suggest that for a community used to combat, a CSM is seen as having
the most authority when they are seen behaving in ways most akin to a successful
alliance within the game: navigating conflict, battling on behalf of the player base, and
making sure the game is fair for all involved. When the CSM’s activities have a more
cooperative function—building relationships, giving feedback, helping with the
development process—the players seem a bit puzzled about what they are doing and why.
“Things have been very quiet,” described one player. “CCP doesn’t seem inclined to go
insane again just to give the CSM something to do.”286 And while as CSM7 Chairman
Seleene suggested that the CSM’s public activity tends to be a reflection of its
relationship with CCP, the fact that “things were happening fairly well over the past year,
so there wasn’t a lot of rabble to be raised” tends to slip by a community that simply does
not know peace in-game. For EVE players, peace allows no opportunity for the combat
game play that keeps the game fun and interesting for much of the player base. Battle is
where the most interesting, engaging, and emergent gameplay happens, and it is harder to
see institutions like the CSM as relevant when they focus on the more cooperative and
peaceful ventures.
The hope from CSM7 is that the legacy they leave down the road will speak for
itself in terms of the work they have accomplishment through the expansions and game
play that has come as a result of such collaborative efforts. Perhaps then the player base
will see that new ground can be forged between old enemies, and that old hostilities such
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as the T20 incident can finally be put to rest. But then again as any EVE player would
ask, what fun would that be?
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Chapter V: Conclusion
After the long winter months, the snow outside had just begun to melt. The
weather was turning warm, and the sun shone outside my apartment. I looked at the
people enjoying the very beginning of spring, and turned back to my computer. Other
things were heating up that required more immediate attention. Election season was in
full swing in New Eden, and the Jita Park Speakers Corner was cluttered with posts
outlining platforms and election promises. EVE’s satellite network of associated
websites, blogs, news sites, and twitter feeds engaged in open speculation on the outcome
of the election.
Official election information was decentralized, disorganized and sporadically
released. While the distribution of accurate and timely information is critical in any
election, it was doubly so during CSM8. The election of CSM8 brought with it some of
the new changes to the White Paper that CSM7 implemented over the past year,
including the new Single Transferrable Vote system. To make it on to the election ballot,
candidates must now be endorsed by 200 voters in a pre-election. During the actual
election, a player must then select 14 of the possible candidates in order of preference.
After all the ballots have been cast, they are run through advanced calculations to allot
the votes where they are most effective. For example, votes that would be “lost” due to
overvoting—a vote given to a candidate that already has enough votes to make it on to
the council—or undervoting—where a vote is cast for a candidate that has no chance of
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making it on to the council—the votes are then moved upward or downward to the next
candidate in order of each voter’s preference.287
While the actual mechanics of such a system are relatively straight forward—CCP
released the code that was used to process the votes as a measure of transparency—the
explanation of such a representative system is long and overly complicated.288 Voter
apathy is an ongoing concern within EVE’s player base, and the growing worry among
the community was that a more complicated voting system, announced close to the
election, that puts a greater responsibility on the individual would make already low
numbers fall.289
The sporadic release of information was blamed on working the STV code into
the development team’s tight schedule.290 However, this among other election mishaps
raised early concerns over CCP’s handling of the election process. For example,
candidates received updates on how many more endorsements were needed to reach the
qualifying 200. Due to an internal error, “false positive” notifications were sent out to
candidates that had not yet qualified; this led to loss of campaign time for those
individuals that needed it most.291 Two candidates were removed from the running by
CCP: Fon Revedhort was removed after professing Neo-Nazi sentiments on the official
forums and during candidate interviews.292 Xenuria was supposedly removed after being
accused of belonging to the hacker group LulzSec, which attacked EVE Online’s servers
in June 2011.293
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In addition, some CSM Skype logs were leaked by Darius III, a member of CSM7
who had spent most of the term absent, claiming that another incidence of developer
misconduct had occurred. While this story is still developing and under investigation by
CCP, most players seem to write it off as nothing more than a bid for attention.294 Some
of this was admittedly par for the course in CSM elections. “Think of the dirtiest election
in [real life],” described one informant. “That would be a boring CSM election. Lots of
character assassination, forum-warrioring, trolling, etc.”
For my purposes, some of the developing community concerns were somewhat
moot at this point. Following the campaigns and platforms of candidates as they
emerged, I voted with my two accounts both in the pre-election and in the real election as
soon as voting opened.295 In EVE, “Vote early, vote often,” is sound advice. The
intermittent information released by CCP could have clarified the somewhat complicated
process.296 As a voter, the criticism that the new system adds additional barriers to voting
carries some weight. The community stepped up to fill the information void in what CCP
promised to be a heavily promoted election; websites designed to match players with
candidate platforms, extensive candidate interviews, reward programs for voting, and
long lists of candidate endorsements were widely shared.297 Despite these efforts, the
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voter turnout was only 12.12%, down from 16.63% in the CSM7 election.298 While
according to CCP calculations, an individual’s vote made a greater impact under the new
system—a shift from 53% enfranchisement to 85.1%—the dip in already low turnout is
still disconcerting.299
This is one of the issues brought up to the outgoing CSM7 at EVE’s Fanfest. The
CSM panel has become a fixture during EVE’s yearly fan convention in Iceland, giving
the community a chance to ask questions of the outgoing council. It one of the few times
the community has an opportunity to see the council together as players, rather than hear
their words through blogs, forum posts, or podcasts.300 CSM results are announced the
last day of the convention, and the CSM panel allows the outgoing council to look back
over the contributions they have made to the EVE community. “In sort of typical EVE
fashion, you had a very simple voting system and then you made it way more complex,”
joked Dierdra Vaal.301 A veteran member of CSM1, CSM3, and CSM5, Vaal ran Vote
Match 2.0 during this election season, a website which helped match with players
candidates that matched their vision of EVE.302 His voice carries weight due to
experience on the CSM and prominence within the EVE community.
“I have encountered a lot of players who were sort of scared away by its
complexity,” Vaal continued. “Some people I noticed found it very intimidating. Are
you not worried then that having a single transferrable vote and a 14 person ballot is
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going a bit too far and making it a bit too intimidating for players who aren’t intimately
familiar with the CSM process?”303
CSM7 is divided on the issue. “It looks more complex and that probably does
scare a lot of people at first,” quipped Elise Randolph. “Then they probably remember
they are playing EVE, and it is probably the easiest thing they will do that day.”304 For
others, the frustration of the player base reflects the more systemic issue of CCP support.
“CCP needs to invest resources in promoting the election, and making the CSM visible,
and explaining to players what we do,” described Hans Jagerblitzen.305 While he
admitted that CCP made some efforts toward the end of the election, Jagerblitzen
suggested:
I think we all know that there could have been more support for the
election, and there should always be that increasing support for the
elections... CCP Dolan has done an excellent job since taking his position
of doing what he can to give us those tools, but he needs more support
from the company. He needs more resources invested in us as well.306
There has been a gradual handover in power from the previous CSM project leader, CCP
Xhagen, to CCP Dolan. A former pilot within the TEST Alliance Please Ignore, the
handover to CCP Dolan moves the CSM project more into the realm of EVE’s
community team.307 While his background within TEST has raised some questions about
impartiality in light of the T20 scandal, CSM7 Chairman Seleene assured that is not of
real concern.308 “[CCP Dolan]’s a good guy,” Seleene described during a community
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question and answer session. “He is adapting to a very big situation, and he has got some
very big shoes to fill. He is doing a pretty good job so far.”309
Many changes have been implemented with the election of CSM8; it is apparent
that between the changeover in management and the new election system, things did not
run smoothly. Among the most critical charges are the lack of promotion of the election
and the failure to distribute information. To compound the problem, the CSM did not
directly address this lack of attention from CCP. As one player describes:
“There is no collective statement or blog post from the group as a whole.
Not only do CCP seem not to care about the election, we are getting
nothing from the current CSM about what they are doing to fix a massive
[lack of information] that is clearly at the forefront of the community’s
concerns.
It is clear from tweets from certain CSM7 members that they are unhappy
with what is happening. I have spoken to certain members of CSM7
privately and they are giving nothing away other than to confirm that they
are very disappointed with the situation. I presume they are working with
CCP on a solution. But we have complete radio silence from them as a
body publicly… Then we have a situation where CCP seem unwilling to
invest any real effort in the election despite assurances to the contrary.
And yet CCP clearly appears to have CSM7 in their pocket, telling them
anything they need to hear to keep them quiet.”310
For a community that routinely uses propaganda in its game play, the lack of information
is as telling as messages that are controlled by the strongest alliances. While some of the
CSM’s silence can be attributed to their non-disclosure agreement, the absence of
communication from either party is a disconcerting hole in the public discourse. For the
moment, the election remains an event that remains unframed by the politics of either
entity—the CSM or CCP—who have a vested interest in how that story is told. In EVE,
the continual negotiation of those narrative frames is part of what drives the emergent
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gameplay that players find compelling. While this does not necessarily mean that no
attention is paid behind closed doors, the absence of interplay between CCP and the CSM
at the time when it is historically most visible is confusing. As one player asks, does
“CCP’s lack of enthusiasm and promotion for this years [sic] CSM vote [indicate] how
they feel about the role of CSM’s? [sic] I mean, if they don’t take the voting very
seriously doesn't it beg the question of how seriously they view the position itself?”311
Not all players believe that the lack of public discourse is as innocent. Describes
another player:
CCP isn’t responsible for forced voting on the players or massive [get out
the vote] campaigns about the CSM. If anything, from CCP’s perspective,
the weaker the CSM is, the easier it is for CCP developers to do what they
do with as little interference as possible.312
From this perspective, the lack of public promotion becomes a way to ensure that the
power dynamic stays balanced in CCP’s favor; the CSM becomes a way to simply
channel public discontent onto an institution that can only be as powerful as players
choose to make it.
Such community speculation illustrates the potential for multiple interpretations
an event like a particularly lackluster election promotion can have on a community that
relies on narrative to make sense of public events. In a virtual world where player action
has the potential to impact the entire player base, the absence of public interest by either
party leaves players questioning the relevance of the CSM to that public sphere. How
events are framed and how the story is told becomes a very important way for players to
understand how power and relevance are reckoned among EVE’s 500,000 accounts.
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The deliberate shape of public narrative becomes particularly important when
much of EVE’s negotiation of power takes place behind closed doors. The true dynamics
between powerful actors are not open to public scrutiny; in order for those exchanges to
be known to the rest of the player base, those stories have to be told. “One of the most
alarming lessons of playing EVE Online is that the galaxy is literally ruled in a smokefilled back room with 15 guys in it,” described one informant. In order for those more
informal, influential power dynamics to play out through the rest of the server, those
perspectives need to be stated deliberately to shape public understanding of relationships
between powerful actors. In the case of the CSM, much of the negotiation with CCP
occurs behind closed doors. The fact that neither party wants to shape how the player
base understands that relationship is reflective of a disconcerting shift in the relationship,
though the rest of the community can only speculate what that shift might be.
The negotiation of power apart from public scrutiny is reflective of the cultural
skepticism of democracy and the culture of secrecy that EVE itself cultivates. Power and
decisions are always negotiated with the mindset that someone might be listening, that
these channels of communication might already be compromised by spies and other
actors that are out for personal gain. Within EVE, those real or imagined threats lead to
decisions being made within smaller circles of the highest trust, away from public debate
or discussion.

Known threats are often not eliminated but rather managed, and

controlled misinformation leaked to enemy alliances.
The potential for virtual worlds to facilitate such behind-the-scenes negotiations
of power is at once both compelling and mundane. Informal agreements between
interested actors is “fundamentally where human political behavior happens,” described
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one informant. “You play EVE and you deal with stuff like the CSM or null sec for long
enough and then you look at the real world and you go ‘Huh. This is eight guys in some
back room in Capitol Hill getting drunk on too many martinis.’” As outside observers we
can see these same tendencies within the CCP-CSM relationship. The more formal,
process-oriented, democratic tendencies of the early CSM were ineffective in negotiating
change. New avenues of communication, such as the Skype channel between developers
and CSM representatives, were created to facilitate such informal discussions. However,
even then the real work takes place outside even that more secret, inclusive space. In
speaking of the leak of the CSM Skype channel logs, Hans Jagerblitzen confirmed that “a
lot of social, ice-breaking sort of conversations go on there, and that a lot of the serious
business takes place elsewhere.”313
These more informal, private arrangements serve to both shape and undermine the
order that an institution such as the CSM is alleged to provide. The CSM serves to open
more formal channels of communication between CCP and the player base, and to
establish a formal process for conveying that feedback. At the same time, informal
arrangements between individual actors serve to shape these relationships of power in
ways that are not open for public scrutiny. The explicit and implicit goals of each set of
allegiances do not necessarily work to reinforce the other; this opposition was apparent
during CSM5 and CSM6, and the Incarna expansion. As an institution, the CSM
becomes an expression of the regularizing processes and situational adjustment between
the CSM’s structures and the social agreements that allow individual actors to make do
within the nuanced social landscape.314
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This negotiation between rule-governed structures and the indeterminate ways in
which actors behave within that system are further embedded within their specific
cultural contexts. Composed of players from a diverse set of play styles and countries,
EVE culture serves as a reference for individual actors as they seek to enact change
through the CSM. Yet the institution they create exists in part to facilitate interactions
with CCP, which has its own set of corporate and Icelandic cultural conventions that
EVE players do not necessarily share. These different cultures inform individual
behavior as they influence each other to enact change on the server level. Specifically,
the emergent behavioral norms within EVE shape interactions and expectations players
have for CCP. These conventions are in part players’ own adaptations to working within
EVE’s environment of constant war and uncertainty. It is the negotiation of these
complex social and cultural landscapes that is what makes both the CSM and EVE’s
gameplay compelling. As that negotiation takes place behind closed doors, it becomes all
that more crucial for the narrative to be shared with the rest of us. While that discourse is
in some way shaped by the powerful that decide the shape of that worldview, it is in line
with the sandbox style objectives that EVE sought to create in the first place. EVE
“offers more freedom but it requires you to think and be an active participant” in the
adventures you create.315 The CSM becomes a unique way to tell and construct the story
between the players and creators of EVE’s virtual world, though the dynamics of that
relationship change and are not always open to public scrutiny.

315

From an archived version of the EVE Online FAQ, quoted in (Amazon Basin 2012).
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Glossary
0.0 – See null security.
Alliance – a collective organization of several corporations.
AURA – the built-in, onboard ship computer in the game interface. AURA provides
players with a variety of information, including access to new player tutorials.
Avatar – The graphical representation of a user within a virtual world.
Blue print originals or BPOs – Blue print original serve as plans for manufacturing
valuable goods, such ships or ammunition. BPOs can serve as templates to create copies
of these plans, which are destroyed in the production process. Tech 1, or more common,
blue print originals can be bought from NPC corporations. Tech 2 BPOs cannot be
created or sold via the market; a limited number were given away through a lottery
system and can only be purchased from other players. This makes T2 BPOs incredibly
valuable.
Capsule – See pod.
Care Bear – A colloquial term for a pilot that plays predominantly in high security or
Empire space. These areas carry stronger penalties for player-versus-player actions, and
are policed by CONCORD. This makes high sec a relatively safer place to exist for those
that do not enjoy PvP, though no area in EVE is truly safe.
Clone – Within EVE’s game mythology, cloning allows EVE’s pilots immortality.
When a pilot’s body is destroyed, their consciousness is downloaded into a new clone. A
clone must be kept current with the player’s number of skill points, which is how players
gain access to new abilities. Should a player not be current on their clone, they lose a
percentage of their skill points upon pod death. As skills train in real time, one at a time,
this may set a player back months of real life time.
Council of Stellar Management or CSM – the player-elected council that represents
community issues to CCP.
CONCORD – the NPC police force that responds to non-sanctioned acts of aggression
within high security systems with deadly force. This provides consequences for criminal
behavior. Response time depends on the relative security rating of the individual system.
The wrath of CONCORD is referred to as “concordokken” or simply being “concorded.”
Corporate History – a list of corporations that a character has belonged to since its
creation.
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Corporation or Corps – Corporations are large groups of players that band together for a
common goal. These are similar to guilds or clans in other MMOs.
Crowd Control Productions or CCP – the Icelandic video game developer and
publisher that produces Eve Online.
Empire Space – See high security.
Gallente – one of the four available player races.
Gamemaster or GM – Gamemasters serve as moderators in many games, both online
and offline. Within MMOs, gamemasters tend to provide a customer service role that
provides players support in areas of gameplay, bug reporting, player interactions, account
issues, etc.
Ganking – Killing another player unfairly. Some games use this to describe a group
killing a single player. Other games use it to describe the killing of a player immediately
after they revive after death, or respawn. However, the common thread between these
several definitions is the unfairness of the death in question.
Gate camp – a small gang of players wait for an unsuspecting pilot to warp into the
system through the stargate. They will then destroy the player’s ship before the pilot gets
time to react, and salvage the ship’s materials for money.
High security – High sec space is designated by systems with a security rating of 0.5 to
1.0. High sec is patrolled by CONCORD. An act of non-sanctioned aggression would
cause CONCORD to appear and retaliate with deadly force. This makes high sec
somewhat safer than other areas of the game; however, there is no truly safe space in
EVE.
Internet culture – The emergent culture that has arisen on the internet as a result of
computer networks. This includes, but is not limited to, online communities, virtual
worlds, MMOs, internet-based games, forum communities, social networking, and
texting.
Internet meme – Ideas or concepts that are shared from person to person. Tracing back
the concept to Richard Dawkins’s book The Selfish Gene, these image or text-based ideas
spread and replicate cultural information via transmission over the Internet.
Internet slang – Internet slang could be broadly defined as the wide variety of slang
languages that arise to support internet cultures. These include a wide variety of
practices, such as particular acronyms (“OMG” for “oh my god”), leetspeak (“n00b” for
“noob”), disemvoweling (“srs” for “serious”), intentional misspellings (“teh” for “the”),
etc. See (Kim 2010).
Interstellar Kredit or ISK – EVE’s in-game currency.
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Interstellar Services Department or ISD – a volunteer group that assists CCP on a
variety of tasks, such as quality assurance, bug reporting, news reporting, fiction writing,
administration of the official EVElopedia page, and forum moderation.
Jabber – an open-source instant messaging application that allows players to chat over
the internet. Available at www.jabber.org.
Machinima – a film made through a 3D computer graphics rendering engine.
Massively Multiplayer Online Game or MMO – a massively multiplayer online game
or MMO is a persistent virtual universe in which players come together to complete game
challenges.
Metagame – The use of out-of-game resources, activities, or information to affect ingame play. This could refer to information gained from internet forums, voice chat
servers, corporate espionage, etc.
Microtransactions – The sale of in-game virtual goods for real world money
Minmatar – one of the four available player races.
Mission – Similar to quests in other games, a mission is a task given to a player by an
NPC to earn a reward. This may include reputation, money, or in-game items. In EVE,
there are four general types of missions: security missions that feature combat,
distribution missions that involve delivery of goods, mining missions that involve
procuring minerals, and research missions that involve scientific research.
Module – a piece of equipment that is attached to a ship to enhance its abilities.
MUD Object-Oriented or Moo – stands for “MUD object-oriented,” and MUD stands
for “multi-user dungeon” or “multi-user domain.” These are text-based environments
which provide persistent virtual worlds in which players can interact. In MUDs, the
focus is entirely text-based, and players respond to challenges that have been built into
the system. In MOOs, players create persistent in-game objects as a way of setting their
own challenges and shaping the world to their liking.
Multi-User Domain or MUD – See MUD object-oriented.
Mumble – an open-source voice over IP application designed for text and voice chat. All
communications are encrypted to ensure player privacy. Available at
http://mumble.sourceforge.net/.
New Eden – the name given to EVE Online’s universe. Within the game lore, it is also
the name of the first star system settled by humans after traveling to the area.
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Non-Disclosure Agreement or NDA – a legal contract between parties that outlines
confidential information that is to be shared between the parties, but restrict its access by
third parties. These may protect confidential or proprietary information.
Non-Player Characters or NPCs – virtual actors within a game that are controlled by
server-side game programing. These may be friendly or hostile.
Null security – Null sec is a lawless area outside of the purview of CONCORD. This
makes it the domain of stronger alliances that retain sovereignty over higher value
resources.
Pilot License Extension or PLEX – a virtual item that can be used to add 30 days of
game time to a player’s account. A PLEX can be purchased with real world money, and
can be traded on EVE’s auction house.
Player-Owned Starbase or POS – semi-permanent, anchorable structures that can be
placed around a moon. These allow corporations a wide range of benefits such as
research opportunities, manufacturing facilities, moon mining, infrastructure, staging
locations for fleet operations, etc. These can be placed in systems with a security rating
of 0.7 or lower.
Player Versus Environment or PvE – In this form of gameplay, players battle virtual
opponents that are generated by the game. These are referred to as NPCs or non-player
characters.
Player Versus Player or PvP – In this form of gameplay, players battle other users in
combat. In EVE, this is generally considered ship-to-ship combat. However, the term
may be applied to any form of battle between players, such as market competition or
metagame activities.
Pod – A pilot’s escape vessel. Should a pilot’s ship be destroyed, they are given the
ability to escape through a pod. This does not guarantee escape, as pods can also be
destroyed.
Podding – The destruction of a player’s escape pod. While the game lore itself describes
that pilots are immortal and upon death will wake up in a newly cloned body, the actual
penalties for pod death may be severe in terms of loss of skill points and training time. In
practice, podding is looked as adding insult to injury.
Roleplaying or RP – A kind of collective storytelling, roleplay in video games allows
concepts to structure in-game actions. These may be individual or group backstories that
determine player behavior. Instead of using the avatar as solely an extension of self or a
vehicle to navigate the environment, it becomes a character in the broader narratives that
are told through game events, history, and lore.
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Single Transferrable Vote system or STV – To make it on to the election ballot,
candidates are endorsed by 200 voters in a pre-election. During the actual election, a
player must then select 14 of the possible candidates in order of preference. After all the
ballots have been cast, they are run through advanced calculations to allot the votes
where they are most effective. For example, votes that would be “lost” due to
overvoting—a vote given to a candidate that already has enough votes to make it on to
the council—or undervoting—where a vote is cast for a candidate that has no chance of
making it on to the council—the votes are then moved upward or downward to the next
candidate in order of each voter’s preference.
Skill – The equivalent of spells in other MMOs, skills “govern the abilities of your
character. They determine which ships you can fly, what modules you can use, the
effectiveness to which you can use those ships/modules, and much more” (EVELopedia
2011). These are learned through skillbooks, which are bought over the market.
Skype – a voice-over-internet-protocol application that allows users to communicate with
others over voice, video, or text-based chat. Available at www.skype.com
Sovereignty – the control of a particular region of space within EVE Online. This allows
alliances to build structures within the system.
Stargate – a means of travel between planetary systems. Players warp between stargates
to travel long distances in space.
Tech – Tech levels are used to rate the quality of different modules that can be used to
outfit a ship. Tech 1 modules are more common, and are thus more affordable. Tech 2
modules are more effective and more powerful than their Tech 1 counterparts. They
require higher skill levels to use, and are more expensive.
Threadnought – A threadnought is a forum post with many replies. In general, topics
that generate the most discussion are those in which players express dismay or rage over
a controversial topic. The name is a play on words between a forum “thread” and a
“dreadnought,” one of the largest ships in Eve. While slow and cumbersome to navigate,
dreadnoughts have immense firepower that can lay siege to the largest player structures
in the game, the player-owned starbase or POS. With effective use, a dreadnought can
change the course of a war. Similarly, the slow but successful change of public opinion
over the forums can be as formidable of a weapon as the largest ships.
Unsub – Short for “un-subscribe,” unsubbing is the cancellation of a player’s account in
a subscription-based setting. While many players can be unhappy with changes made to
their virtual worlds, they rarely cancel their accounts. The time invested in building their
avatars, communities, and worlds can generally not be taken with them should they
choose to move to a different game. Therefore unsubbing is generally an empty threat.
When players unsub in masse, it sends a very powerful message to game creators.
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Vanity content – Items that provide social prestige within the game. Vanity items
generally have no impact on game mechanics.
War – In EVE, war is both an organized social conflict and a game mechanic.
Declarations of war or war decs can be purchased by CEOs. War deccing another
corporation or alliance flags enemy players in the game as hostile; you may then attack
them without security status penalty or retaliation from CONCORD. Enemy corporation
assets such as star bases, customs offices, etc. are also considered fair game. War will go
into effect 24 hours after declaration, and will last one week, unless the war bill is
renewed.
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